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Abstract
This thesis contributes to economic growth and long-run economic development
literature which continues to be the most exciting, challenging and admissible
sub-areas of economics. Growth and development is multi-faceted as it is not just
concerned with the growth at aggregate levels but it also includes the elemental
changeover of the economy, for instance, social, institutional, sectoral and struc-
tural transformations. This leads to the rich cluster of questions and various new
econometric methods and approaches to find their answers. Some of these ques-
tions such as sources of growth pattern differences among countries, the factors
responsible for the differences in progress of a nation and the impact of finan-
cial development and remittances on economic growth are the subjects of present
work. The suitable modeling techniques are adopted to recognize the sources and
causes, and also to explain the underlying factors and variables responsible for
such growth variations and differences across countries.
This dissertation comprises of three chapters addressing three different aspects re-
lated to growth and development of the countries. In second chapter, the sources of
growth are determined around growth regime changes using DEA- Malmquist Pro-
ductivity Index technique combined with the derived structural breaks in growth
series. The variant of unified Fit and Filter methodology is applied, which allows
to detect large number of breaks in growth series which get excluded in case of
filter based methods or statistical techniques. This approach helps to determine
the structural breaks in the growth series firstly, by identifying true breaks in
the volatile growth series, generally related to developing countries and secondly,
by detecting the false breaks in relatively smooth growth series, usually associ-
ated with developed countries. Moreover, the productivity growth is decomposed
into efficiency change, technological progress, capital deepening and human capi-
tal accumulation using DEA-Based Malmquist Productivity Index approach. The
results suggest importance of efficiency changes for both positive and negative
structural breaks in growth series. Besides, they also highlight the positive role of
factor accumulation on growth accelerations.
A two-stage (DEA and regression) analysis of the determinants of Nation’s progress
is conducted in the third chapter. Nation’s progress of a country is an essential el-
ement in growth theory, and its measurement is not exclusively based on economic
factors but also on social, environmental and human welfare variables. The aim
of this study is to examine the influence of the potential economic, institutional,
demographic and geographic determinants on the progress of a nation. The per-
formance of a nation is measured as an estimated efficiency score within which it
transforms a given number of endowments such as human and physical capital into
national well-being and general human welfare. The economic, environmental and
human well-being yardsticks, namely GDP per capita, persons employed, carbon
dioxide emission and availability of clean water with proper sanitation facilities are
used to measure the nation’s progress. The estimated bias adjusted performance
scores in stage 1 are regressed on the potential covariates. Simar and Wilson’s
double bootstrap procedure is used, which allows valid inferences in the presence
of an unknown serial correlation in the efficiency scores. The second stage results
reveal that the considered covariates play a significant role in the progress of a
nation.
In fourth chapter, a panel of 103 countries including developed and developing
economies over the period 1980-2014 is used to study the role of financial de-
velopment, remittances and their interaction terms on economic growth and to-
tal productivity. The results suggest positive role of financial development (FD)
and remittances (REM) on economic growth. Moreover, the interaction terms
(FD.REM) support the substitution hypothesis, which suggest the relaxing role
of remittances in case of weak financial markets in receiving countries. However,
the role of financial development and remittances on productivity growth is in-
significant. Furthermore, the state of development of the countries also influences
vthe corresponding roles of remittances, financial development and their interaction
terms on economic growth.
Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Arbeit leistet einen Beitrag zur empirischen Wachstumsliteratur
und damit auch zum Themengebiet der langfristigen Wirtschaftsentwicklung. Dieses
Gebiet der Volkswirtschaftslehre stellt nach wie vor das spannendste, aber auch
herausforderndste Teilgebiet dar. Wachstum und Entwicklung sind vielschichtige
Pha¨nomene, so dass nicht nur Gro¨ßen auf aggregierten Ebenen beru¨cksichtigt
werden du¨rfen, sondern auch elementare Vera¨nderungen der Wirtschaft, wie die
sozialen, institutionellen sektor-spezifischen und strukturellen Eigenschaften beachtet
werden mu¨ssen. Dies wirft ein breites Spektrum an Fragen auf, zu deren Beant-
wortung verschiedene und neue o¨konometrische Methoden und Ansa¨tze beno¨tigt
werden. Einige dieser Fragen, die mit der vorliegenden Arbeit beantwortet wer-
den sollen, lauten: ,,Welche Faktoren liegen den zu beobachtbaren Unterschieden
in den Wachstumsmustern einzelner La¨nder zugrunde? Welche Faktoren sind fu¨r
die Unterschiede im Fortschritt einer Nation verantwortlich? Wie wirken sich die
finanziale Entwicklung und die Ru¨cku¨berweisungen auf das Wirtschaftswachstum
aus? Geeignete Modellierungsverfahren wurden adaptiert und angewandt, um
einerseits die Ursachen von Wachstumsunterschieden zu ermitteln, und um ander-
erseits die zugrundeliegenden Faktoren und Variablen fu¨r solche Wachstumsvaria-
tionen und deren Unterschiede zwischen einzelnen La¨ndern zu erkla¨ren.
Die vorliegende Arbeit besteht aus insgesamt vier Kapiteln, in denen unterschiedliche
Aspekte im Zusammenhang mit Wachstum und Entwicklung von La¨ndern behan-
delt werden.
Im zweiten Kapitel werden die Ursachen fu¨r Wachstum in Bezug auf Vera¨nderungen
im Wachstumsmuster untersucht. Als Grundlage hierzu dienen der DEA-Malmquist
Produktivita¨ts-Index sowie hergeleitete Strukturbru¨che in den Wachstumsraten.
Eine Variante der Fit-und-Filter-Methode wird herangezogen, die es erlaubt, ha¨ufig
vorkommende Strukturbru¨che in der Datenreihe der Wachstumsraten aufzudecken,
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welche beim Einsatz von filterbasierenden oder statistischen Methoden nicht er-
mittelt werden ko¨nnen. Dieser Ansatz findet Strukturbru¨che einerseits dadurch,
dass er die Identifikation von realen Unterbrechungen in den unstetigen Wach-
stumsraten, wie sie ha¨ufig bei Entwicklungsla¨ndern auftreten, ermo¨glicht, und
andererseits scheinbare Strukturbru¨chen in relativ stetigen Wachstumsraten, wie
sie u¨blicherweise bei Industriestaaten vorliegen, feststellt. Daru¨ber hinaus wird
die Produktivita¨tssteigerung unter den Gesichtspunkten der Effizienza¨nderung,
des technologischen Fortschritts, der Kapitalintensivierung sowie der Akkumula-
tion von Humankapital mit Hilfe des DEA-Based-Malmquist Produktivita¨tsindex -
Ansatzes zerlegt. Die Ergebnisse weisen auf die Bedeutung von Effizienza¨nderungen
fu¨r positive und negative strukturelle Bru¨che in Wachstumsreihen hin. Außerdem
betonen sie die positive Rolle der Faktorakkumulation bei Wachstumsbeschleuni-
gungen.
In Kapitel drei wird eine zwei-Stufen-Analyse (DEA und Regression) u¨ber die
Determinanten des Fortschritts eines landes durchgefu¨hrt. Der Fortschritt eines
landes ist ein wesentliches Element der Wachstumstheorie. Seine Messung basiert
nicht nur ausschließlich auf wirtschaftlichen Faktoren, sondern wird auch durch
soziale, o¨kologische Variabeln als auch durch das menschliche Wohlergehen bee-
influsst. Ziel der Studie ist es, den Einfluss potentieller wirtschaftlicher, institu-
tioneller, demographischer und geografischer Determinanten auf den Fortschritt
einer Nation zu untersuchen. Die Leistung eines landes wird als gescha¨tzter Ef-
fizienzwert gemessen, bei dem eine Reihe von Faktoren, wie menschliches und
physisches Kapital, in nationales Wohlbefinden und allgemein menschliches Woh-
lergehen umgewandelt werden. Die wirtschaftlichen, o¨kologischen und menschlichen
Wohlfahrtsmaßsta¨be, na¨mlich das Pro-Kopf-BIP, die Bescha¨ftigungszahlen, die
Kohlendioxidemissionen und die Verfu¨gbarkeit von sauberem Wasser mit geeigneten
sanita¨ren Einrichtungen werden zur Messung des Fortschritts eines landes verwen-
det. Die gescha¨tzten Werte fu¨r die Bias Adjusted Performance in Stufe 1 sind
auf die potentiellen Kovariaten zuru¨ckgebildet. Hierzu wird das von Simar und
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Wilsons entwickelte doppelte Bootstrap Verfahren eingesetzt, da es trotz Anwe-
senheit von unbekannten seriellen Korrelationen in den Effizienzwerten gu¨ltige
Schlu¨sse zu ziehen erlaubt. Die Ergebnisse der zweiten Phase zeigen, dass die
betrachteten Kovarianten eine bedeutende Rolle fu¨r den Fortschritt einer Nation
spielen.
Im vierten Kapitel werden Daten aus 103 Industrie- und Entwicklungsla¨ndern im
Zeitraum von 1980-2014 dazu herangezogen, um die Rolle der finanziellen Entwick-
lung, der Remissen und ihrer Interaktionsbedingungen fu¨r das Wirtschaftswachs-
tum und die Gesamtproduktivita¨t zu untersuchen. Die Ergebnisse deuten auf eine
positive Rolle der finanziellen Entwicklung (FD) und der Remissen (REM) auf
das Wirtschaftswachstum hin. Daru¨ber hinaus unterstu¨tzen die Interaktionsterme
(FD.REM) die Substitutionshypothese, welche auf eine entspannende Rolle von
Geldu¨berweisungen im Falle schwacher Finanzma¨rkte in den Aufnahmela¨ndern
hindeutet. Die Rolle der finanziellen Entwicklung und der Remissen fu¨r das Pro-
duktivita¨tswachstum ist jedoch unbedeutend. Daru¨ber hinaus beeinflusst der En-
twicklungsstand der La¨nder auch die entsprechenden Rollen von u¨berweisungen, fi-
nanzieller Entwicklung und deren Interaktionsbedingungen auf das Wirtschaftswach-
stum.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economic growth and long-run economic development literature continues to be
the most exciting, challenging and admissible sub-areas of economics. Growth
and development is multi-faceted as it is not just concerned with the growth at
aggregate levels but it includes the elemental change-over of the economy such as
the social, institutional, environmental, sect-oral and structural transformations.
There is a long history of economic growth and development analysis of countries
and regions and also the distribution of outcomes of economic activity among pop-
ulation and the factors affecting economic growth. This leads to the rich cluster
of questions and various new econometric methods and approaches to find out
their answers. In general, measurement of the economic performance of a country
is becoming fundamental for economic growth and development analysis and also
for the policy making, whereby, the assessment of growth and development is done
mostly in terms of GDP.
This thesis consists of three separate papers which empirically investigate three
different aspects related to economic growth and progress of the countries. The
non-parametric growth accounting techniques are employed in this work to deter-
mine the changes in total productivity and its sources, that is, technical efficiency
2 Introduction
and technological changes, and efficiency scores. Data envelopment analysis (DEA)
is a linear programming technique, developed by Charnes et al. (1978) [61], used
to estimate production function. DEA is extensively used to determine technical
efficiency in a range of industries [63]. The key advantage of non- parametric ac-
counting technique, DEA, is that it accommodates multiple inputs and multiple
outputs more easily. Moreover, there is no need to impose a specific functional
form of production function in a model.
In the second chapter, research efforts are focused on the decomposition of pro-
ductivity changes into its components (efficiency and technological changes, cap-
ital deepening and human capital accumulation) around the structural breaks in
growth series. Since Data Envelopment Analysis explicitly allows for the possibil-
ity of non-efficient production, catch up growth due to the efficiency improvements
and growth due to the innovations can be distinguished [123]. Fa¨re et al.(1994)
[80], based on the Malmquist productivity index (MPI) [57], showed how to ac-
count for the productivity changes over time. Kumar and Russel (KR) (2002) [134],
under the assumption of constant returns to scale, decomposed changes in income
per worker into efficiency change, technological change and capital accumulation
components. Such decomposition promote the understanding of determinants of a
better performance and provide the private and public sector managers and plan-
ners with the valuable information. Within a two stage DEA in the third chapter,
a bootstrap method as described by Simar and Wilson (2007)[202], to achieve bias
corrected efficiency estimates and to approximate the asymptotic distribution, is
employed. For a two stage procedure the Data Generating Procedure (DGP) in
the second stage presented by them is logically consistent with regressing non-
parametric DEA efficiency scores on covariates that are different from the inputs
used to measure the performance in the first stage. Furthermore, MPI method-
ology is employed in the fourth chapter to obtain growth of total productivity to
determine the impact of financial development and remittances on productivity
growth.
3In second chapter of this dissertation DEA- Malmquist Productivity index tech-
nique is used to decompose total productivity into its components around growth
series transitions (positive or negative breaks). The empirical literature is growing
in this field to shed light on the existence of the structural breaks and furthermore,
on the reasons for the major shifts in growth series. In this work a relatively new
and better technique Fit and Filter as suggested by Kar et al. (2013) [121], which
joins statistical and filter methodology to estimate structural breaks in growth
series, is employed. Unlike cross country growth analysis the main focus of the
current study is on the turning points in growth performance of the countries.
It pays attention to the shifts in the growth paths and the mystery of growth
transition within a country and highlights the fact that average growth rates can
mask very distinct growth paths. Moreover, this work also deals with changes
in productivity as a main source of growth regime changes. The non-parametric
growth accounting technique is used to decompose the productivity changes into
efficiency changes, technological progress, capital deepening and human capital
accumulation. After identification of the structural breaks in growth series for 180
countries the relative importance of productivity changes and factors accumulation
are discussed as proximate causes for the observed shifts. The results suggest the
importance of efficiency changes for both positive and negative structural breaks
in growth series. Besides, they also highlight the positive role of factor accumula-
tion in growth accelerations.
A two-stage (DEA and regression) analysis of the determinants of Nation’s progress
is conducted in the third chapter. Nation’s progress is an essential element in
growth theory and it measures the performance of a country which is not exclu-
sively based on economic factors but also on social, environmental and human
welfare variables. The aim of this study is to examine the influence of the po-
tential economic, institutional, demographic and geographic determinants on the
progress of a nation. The performance of a nation is measured as an estimated
efficiency score within which it transforms a given number of endowments such as
human and physical capital into national well-being and general human welfare.
4 Introduction
The approach to access growth and progress by using only GDP per capita, is
often strongly criticized as it does not measure the inequalities in terms of dif-
ferent dimensions of well-being among nations[65]. Moreover, GDP is only the
proxy or partial measure of multi-dimensional population well-being theme, which
simultaneously includes both economic and non-economic aspects of the societies.
The economic, environmental and human well-being yardsticks, namely GDP per
capita, persons employed, carbon dioxide emission and availability of clean water
with proper sanitation facilities are used to measure the nation’s progress. The es-
timated bias adjusted performance scores in stage 1 are regressed on the potential
covariates. Simar and Wilson’s double bootstrap procedure is used, which allows
valid inferences in the presence of an unknown serial correlation in the efficiency
scores. The second stage results reveal that the considered covariates play a sig-
nificant role in the progress of a nation.
In the fourth chapter a panel of 103 countries including developed and develop-
ing economies over the period 1980-2014 is used to study the role of financial
development, remittances and their interaction terms on economic growth and
total productivity. Panel econometric technique, ordinary least square (OLS) is
used. Moreover, to address the issue of endogeneity, for instance, the plausible
impact of higher economic growth and productivity on remittances and financial
development, leading to overstatement of effects, instrumental variable estima-
tion techniques (IV-2SLS and IV-GMM) are employed. The results suggest the
positive role of financial development (FD) and remittances (REM) on economic
growth. Furthermore, the interaction terms (FD.REM) support the substitution
hypothesis, which suggest the relaxing role of remittances in case of weak financial
markets in the receiving countries. However, the role of financial development and
remittances on productivity growth is found to be insignificant. Besides, the state
of development of the countries also influences the corresponding roles of remit-
tances, financial development and their interaction terms on economic growth.
Chapter 2
Structural Breaks in Growth
Series and Decomposition of
Productivity Changes
A non-parametric growth accounting technique is combined with the derived struc-
tural breaks in growth series to determine the sources of growth around growth
regime changes. The transitions in growth series are determined by using the vari-
ant of unified Fit and Filter methodology, which helps to avoid the weaknesses of
filter based approaches and statistical techniques applied to determine the struc-
tural breaks in the related existing literature. Afterwards, the productivity growth
is decomposed into its components attributable to efficiency change, technological
change, capital deepening and human capital accumulation around the structural
breaks in growth series. The deterministic methods, requiring no functional form
specification for technology or any assumption about market structure or absence
of the market imperfections, are used to construct production frontier. The re-
sults suggest the importance of efficiency changes for both positive and negative
structural breaks in growth series. Besides, they also highlight the positive role of
factor accumulation on growth accelerations.
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2.1 Introduction
The process of economic growth can be better understood by combining the tran-
sitions (up or down breaks) in growth series and the factors causing these transi-
tions. This suggests the analysis of such growth regimes and transition dynamics.
A lot of interesting variations get averaged when growth data is lumped together
without considering the turning points in a growth series. However, a significant
mileage can be obtained by identifying the transitions in a growth experience and
by looking at the sources of these structural breaks. Growth accelerations and
deceleration have been largely the mystery as the “usual aspects” explain only a
small fraction of what is going on during transition [44]. Moreover, the standard
growth theory also emphasizes to look for the shifts in the growth trend to un-
cover and reveal the relationship between growth and its fundamentals. In both
neoclassical and endogenous growth models, as shown in fig 2.1 the best approach
to identify the relevant growth fundamentals is to look for the changes happening
at or before time T, where the growth accelerates [105].
Since early 1990’s, cross country growth regressions are widely used to explain the
differences in the long term growth among the countries. Economists used vari-
ous econometric approaches to shed light on the faster growth of some countries
than others. Early work by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) [35] used cross section
econometrics in which the growth rates for two to three decades is regressed on the
country characteristics and policies. Hall and Jones (1999) [101], and Acemoglu
et al.(2001) [1] focused on level regressions with income as a dependent variable
rather than growth. Islam (1995) [114], and Caselli et al.(1996) [55] used panel
econometric and organized the country level data into the averages over five years
or other intervals. However, all these works ignored the fundamental characteristic
“lack of persistence” of growth of the developing countries. Growth performance
tends to be highly unstable as first mentioned by Easterly et al.(2001) [76]. Only a
few countries experienced high and persistent growth rates over the period of sev-
eral decades. Pritchett (2000) [175] emphasized that if developing country output
paths look more like mountains, cliffs and plains than the steady hills observed
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Figure 2.1: Effect of Growth Fundamentals Improvement at the Time T. [105]
t
T
T
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(a) Neoclassical growth model
(b) Endogenous growth model 
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in the industrial world, then looking for an explanation of average cross-country
growth differences can lead to the misleading results. Therefore, the inspiring
approach can be the exploitation of hidden information in the turning points of
growth performance of the countries [44].
There exist highly unstable growth rates over time, virtually in all the coun-
tries [75, 175]. Moreover, it is hard to explain the persistent differences in living
standards across countries in the world [144]. A voluminous literature on eco-
nomic growth, both theoretical and empirical, attempted to explain these differ-
ences exists. For instance, economic theorists such as Solow (1956) [206], Romer
(1986,1990) [187, 189], Lucas (1988) [144], Aghion and Howitt (1992) [11], Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1997) [36] and Mankiw et al.(1992) [146] discussed them as the
consequence of steady state growth rate dissimilarities across countries. Whereas,
on the empirical side the steady state concept is applied to explain the differences
in long run average growth rates of the countries. However, in preceding literature
it is being realized that this, lumping of the long run growth rates, fails to capture
very important “stylised fact” of economic growth. Moreover, although the growth
pattern of developed economies is well described by the single long run average
growth rate but this is not true for most of the developing countries exhibiting
multiple structural breaks in growth series [121].
External or internal shocks and policy changes can bring sharp shifts in the growth
process thus pushing a country from one growth regime to the other. However,
such shifts may not be accompanied by significant growth fundamentals, like insti-
tutions, education, development of financial institutions, geography, etc. At any
point in time, the growth performance and average long run growth rate of the
country depends upon the regime it is in, how it switches between regimes and
how much time it spends in each regime [115]. This highlights the immense poten-
tial of studying the growth patterns within a country and also suggests to develop
deeper understanding of the impact of determinants like policies and institutions
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on the long run economic growth.
Instead of restricting the analysis to differences in the long run average growth
rates, the empirical literature is growing to shed light on the existence of the struc-
tural breaks and furthermore, on the reasons for the major shifts in growth series.
Two early precursors to this research area are Pritchett (2000) [175], and Ben
David & Papell (1998) [40] who employed the statistical techniques to identify the
shifts in growth performance. Jerzmanowski (2006, 2011) [115, 116] estimated a
Markov- switching model that distinguishes four distinct growth regimes and by
using a multinomial logit model found that institutional quality and policies help
to determine transition probabilities among these “growth states”.
A few relevant research papers, motivated by Pritchett (2000) [175] and the anal-
ogous work by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) [12], Ben David and Papell (1998)
[40], and Easterly et al.(1993) [75], attempting to reveal the informational as-
pects of growth regime transitions and their determinants – are Berg et al.(2012)
[44], Reddy and Minoui (2009) [180], Deana and Gamba (2008) [69], Jones and
Olken (2005, 2008) [117, 118], Paap et al.(2003) [167], Hausmann et al.(2005,
2006) [105, 106], Jerzmanowski (2006, 2011) [115, 116], Pattillo et al.(2005) [170],
Rodrik (1999) [183], Aizenman and Spiegel (2010) [13], Arbache and Page (2010)
[23], Becker and Mauro (2006) [39], Dovern and Nunnenkamp (2007) [72], Jong
A-Pin and De Haan (2007) [119] and Monika Kerekes (2011) [123].
Berg et al.(2012) [44] employed the duration analysis on the data of 140 countries
to look directly at the duration of growth spells. Rodrick (1999) [183] used regres-
sion techniques on cross country growth regimes and presented the growth spells
to unleash the reasons of structural changes. Sahay and Goyal (2007) [93]used the
correlation analysis to highlight the factors that are different across the growth
spells (good and bad). Discrete choice models are used to find the events after
which a growth spell occurred. Although, there are evidences that the changes in
10 Chapter 2 Structural Breaks in Growth Series, . . .
terms of trade, policies, economic reforms, trade liberalization play some role in
the growth transitions but the actual reasons remain largely a mystery.
In accordance with the neoclassical growth models [37, 206], the growth literature
widely accepts the importance of total factor productivity changes in the long run
growth [56, 76, 101, 174]. In neoclassical growth models, the regime dynamics are
caused by changes in the capital stock. Galor and Moav (2004) [89] and Porter
(2011) [173] stressed on the role of capital accumulation at the initial phase of the
industrialization. Although, changes in total factor productivity contribute in the
growth regime changes, there is a surprising role of productivity changes in the
short run [123]. Jones and Olken (2005) [117] investigated the approximate causes
of transitions between high and low growth episodes using parametric growth ac-
counting. They found the relative importance of productivity changes in growth
accelerations and deceleration, whereas, the role of factor accumulation is found
to be small for both types of the growth transitions.
Unlike cross country growth analysis, the main focus of the current study is on the
turning points in growth performance of the countries. It pays attention to the
shifts in the growth paths and the mystery of growth transition within a country
and highlights the fact that average growth rates can mask very distinct growth
paths. Moreover, this work also deals with changes in productivity as a main
source of growth regime changes. The derived structural breaks in the growth
series are used along-with non-parametric growth accounting technique to decom-
pose the productivity changes into efficiency changes, technological progress, cap-
ital deepening and human capital accumulation. After identification of the breaks
in the growth series for 180 countries, the relative importance of productivity
changes and factors accumulation as proximate causes for the observed shifts are
discussed. In this work the non-parametric growth accounting is used, under the
mild assumptions of free disposal and constant returns to scale, which enables to
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decompose total productivity growth into changes in production efficiency, tech-
nological progress, capital deepening and human capital accumulation.
This chapter adds to the the existing pertinent literature in number of ways.
Firstly, the structural breaks are determined by employing a variant of a new
unified approach “Fit and Filter” (FF) suggested by Kar et al.(2013) [121]. The
approach involves two steps, where in the first step the Bai and Perron methodol-
ogy [28–30] is used to select the plausible breaks from the data and in the second
step a filter is applied to the candidate breaks from the first stage. The breaks
are estimated by using strucchange package in R statistical software. This FF ap-
proach helps to remove the weak points of both statistical and filter approach as it
is more broad based and provides an identification mechanism to capture a larger
number of true breaks. Secondly, data coverage is increased by using the Penn
World Table 9.0. Thirdly, each growth episode is required to last for eight years
to make sure that the growth spells are not mixed with the business cycles during
analysis of the sources of growth regime transitions. A total of 546 genuine breaks
are obtained by applying the FF technique out of which more than 65% pertain
to the upper middle, lower middle and lower income countries thus identifying the
structural breaks even in the case of volatile growth series. Fourthly, the sources
of regime transitions are estimated at structural breaks, by using the identified
large number of true breaks. DEA Malmquist productivity index technique is
employed. The role of efficiency change is found to be important in productivity
growth regime changes.
The remaining chapter is organized as follows. The section 2.2 describes the
methodology used to calculate the structural breaks in the growth series and the
theoretical framework of non-parametric growth accounting. Section 2.3 discusses
the data. The results and discussion are presented in the section 2.4. The last
section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Methodology
The breaks in growth regimes are identified using the variant of the Fit and Filter
technique [121]. The non-parametric growth accounting technique is used to obtain
the components of productivity growth. In the following subsections both of the
methodologies are discussed.
2.2.1 Identification of Structural Breaks
The key to understand economic growth lies with the explanation of the transitions
in growth series, rather than explaining the long run growth averages. This re-
quires the knowledge of breaks timing in the growth series. For the determination
of the structural breaks, important questions to be considered are the following:
• How to detect the persistent enough breaks in the growth series to highlight
the growth pattern of a country?
• How to make sure that the breaks are not due to the variance increase of
growth series over time?
Easterly et al.(1993) [75] identified that for most of the countries there is a lack
of persistence in medium term growth rates indicating the transitional (high and
low) growth regimes. Ben David and Papell (1998) [40] showed that most of the
developed and developing countries go through the growth transitions rather than
growing at a steady state. Pritchett (2000) [175] presented that fitting a single
average growth rate over a long period gives very poor statistical results for a large
number of countries, in particular the developing nations. Inspired by the findings
of Pritchett (2000) and related work, a set of recent studies attempted to identify
the breaks in GDP per capita growth series of the countries.
2.2 Methodology 13
In the relevant literature two distinct approaches, developed to measure the struc-
tural breaks, are used. The first approach identifies the growth breaks based
on the subjective rules and known as “Filter based approach”. Hausmann et
al.(2005, 2006) [105, 106] used this approach to study the breaks that involve
growth accelerations and growth collapses, respectively. Aizenman and Spiegel
(2010) [13] studied takeoffs- periods of stagnation followed by periods of sustained
high growth. The second approach uses the statistical structural break tests to
identify the breaks and statistically significant changes in growth series by using
the estimation and testing procedures. In this approach the methodology designed
by Bai and Perron (BP) [28, 29] is used to locate and test the multiple structural
breaks within a time-series framework. In BP methodology, firstly, an algorithm
searches all the possible sets of breaks and determines for each number of breaks
(upto a maximum number of breaks) the set that produces the maximum goodness
of fit. Secondly, the statistical tests determine whether the improved fit allowed
by an additional break is sufficiently large, given what may be expected by chance
[118]. The sequential testing of k versus k + 1 breaks, starting with null or no
breaks, helps to determine the suitable number of breaks.
Jones and Olken (2008) [118] used the Bai- Perron model on small samples, by
implementing the Monte Carlo experiment. The growth process spanning 40 years
was modeled allowing for auto-correlation and structural mean shifts of different
sizes. They found that the Bai- Perron model is “conservative in detecting breaks
and captures only major accelerations and breaks”. Berg et al.(2012) [44] used the
variant of the model proposed by Bai and Perron by extending the algorithm for
sequential testing of structural breaks, described in detail by Antoshin et al.(2008)
[22]. Their approach differs from the Bai-Perron approach as it uses sample spe-
cific critical values, which takes into account the heteroskedasticity and sample
size as compared to the asymptotic critical values, thus improving the power and
size of the test. Kerekes (2011) [123] used the BP model to compute the structural
breaks in growth series with non-parametric growth accounting to find the impact
of total productivity changes and its components on economic growth. Deana
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and Gamba (2008) [69] applied the Bai- Perron model to detect the breaks in the
growth series of 183 countries using the PWT version 6.1 and then regressed both
the negative and positive breaks on three kinds of explanatory variables: external
shocks, institutions and policies.
However, Kar et al.(2013) [121] argued that both the filter-based and statistical
approaches have serious shortcomings. The filter-based approach lacks consistency
in the identification of breaks due to ad-hoc nature of the predetermined filters
by the researcher. Whereas, the Bai and Perron test is limited by the low power
leading to the rejection of true breaks suggested by the behavior of underlying
GDP per capita series. In addition, these two approaches when identifying the
current break, fail to take into account the previous growth breaks in same growth
series of a country. They proposed a unified framework, also used in this research
work, which they called Fit and Filter approach. It involves the best fit of BP
method to the data to select the candidate breaks and then applies the filter on
them to identify the genuine breaks.
A variant of the Fit and Filter approach [121] is used in the current work to iden-
tify the structural breaks in growth series. This helps not only to remove the
short comings of filter based and statistical approaches, as discussed earlier, but
also allows to recognize the larger number of plausible breaks in growth series of
the sample countries. Moreover, as it is difficult for the countries to attain an up
break following a growth acceleration (rapid or miracle growth) or a down break
following a growth deceleration (recession or disaster), this approach explicitly
allows to recognize a non-linearity in the growth process. This helps to obtain a
perodization of growth regimes that are consistent with the historical understand-
ing of economic growth across countries [121].
The Bai and Perron technique (2003) [29] involves two steps. In the first step
maximum number of breaks are estimated given the minimum length of growth
2.2 Methodology 15
regimes and length of the data series. Sequential testing for the optimal number of
statistical significant breaks is done in the second step. The poor power of the BP
test, in the second step of statistical testing procedure, leads to the rejection of a
large number of “true” breaks. As suggested by Kar et al.(2013) [121] an alterna-
tive two step method “Fit and Filter”, which is more broad based and provides
an identification mechanism to capture a larger number of true breaks, is used.
The potential breaks are identified in the first step by using the BP estimation
technique. In the second step, instead of using the statistical procedure to confirm
a genuine break, considered economic filters are applied.
In this work the dynamic programming algorithm as proposed by Bai and Perron
is used to estimate the maximum number of breaks, which are partly determined
by the available length of data series and partly by the minimum length of growth
regimes also called trimming factor or bandwidth and denoted by h. The min-
imum fraction of observations allocated to any one segment is  = h/T , where
T is the sample size and h is the minimum number of observations per segment.
The potential breaks are estimated by assuming various trimming parameters (6
and 8 years). The choice of the periods is subjective, but the shorter periods, for
instance, 3 to 5 years tends to conflate with short run shocks (e.g. earth quakes,
droughts and floods) or business cycle fluctuations. A choice of a longer period
could lead to missing true breaks and reduces the number of potential breaks.
Table 2.1 presents the maximum number of plausible breaks postulated for each
country depending on the length of available data series and the minimum length
of a growth regime.
After estimating the potential breaks by using the first step of BP methodology,
the genuine breaks are confirmed using a variant of FF methodology [121]. This
technique is different from the earlier methods as it recognizes non linearity in
growth dynamics . After achieving a positive growth break it becomes difficult for
a country to sufficiently increase the growth rates to attain another transition of
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Table 2.1: Maximum Number of Candidate Breaks for each Country
Triming factor h (years)
8 6
More than 20 years and upto 30 years 1 2
More than 30 years and upto 40 years 3 4
More than 40 years and upto 50 years 4 6
More than 50 years and upto 60 years 5 7
More than 60 years and upto 65 years 6 9
same or high magnitude. Similarly, it is hard for a country to get another negative
break of similar or high magnitude after incurring a negative growth transition.
Following the Kar et al.(2013), it is logical to consider a smaller increase (decrease)
in growth rates as an positive (negative) break followed by the up (down) break.
The filters applied in this work to determine the breaks are as follows:
i. In case of first potential break (positive or negative), since it is not known
whether it follows an acceleration or deceleration, any change of more than
2% is considered as a growth break.
The breaks after that are determined on the basis of previous history.
ii. The absolute magnitude of the growth difference is considered to be 2% to
qualify as a genuine growth break:
a. if a possible acceleration follows a previous negative break or a candi-
date deceleration follows a positive break.
b. if a possible positive break follows a previous acceleration or a candidate
deceleration follows a negative break.
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2.2.2 Non-Parametric Growth Accounting
A non-parametric growth accounting approach is used in the current work to mea-
sure the contribution of factors accumulation, production efficiency changes and
technological progress in growth series transitions. Fa¨re et al.(1994) [80] con-
structed the worldwide production frontier and associated efficiency levels of the
individual economies (distances from the frontier) by using the work of the pio-
neers in this field, Farrell (1957) [81] and Afriat (1972) [8].
2.2.2.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
DEA is a non-parametric methodology developed by Charnes et al.(1978) [61],
which uses the multiple inputs and outputs to measure an entity’s performance
in the absence of market prices. It is used to measure the efficiency of decision
making units (DMUs) and to evaluate their relative importance [158]. The basic
approach is to envelop the data in the smallest and the tightest fitting convex
cone. The upper boundary of this set gives the “best practice” production func-
tion. The defined benchmark technology is used to measure the efficiency of a
decision making unit (country in the current work). This data-driven approach
is implemented by the standard mathematical programming algorithms, based on
the following weak assumptions:
• Production possibility curve is a convex cone.
• The inputs and outputs are freely disposable.
• All observable input-output combinations are feasible.
• The production technology is of constant returns to scale.
In present work the technology consists of four macroeconomic variables: GDP
as aggregate output whereas labor, physical capital and human capital as three
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aggregate inputs. Let (Yit, Lit, Kit, Hit), t = 1, 2, ..., T., i = 1, 2, ...I., represent T
observations on these four variables for each of the I countries. The human capital
is assumed to enter the technology as a multiplicative augmentation of physical
labor1. So IT observations are Yit, Lˆit, Kit, t = 1, 2, ..., T., i = 1, 2, ..., I. , where
Lˆit = HitLit is the amount of labor input measured in efficiency units in a country
i at time t [108].
For the production frontier calculations in period t, the inter-temporal variant of
DEA that takes into account all input-output bundles that have ever been ob-
served until period t is preferred as it precludes the technological regress2.
Constructing the period t constant returns to scale technology using all data up
to that point in time:
τt = {(Y, Lˆ,K) ∈ <3+ | Y 6
∑
τ6t
∑
i
µiτYiτ ∧K ≥
∑
τ6t
∑
i
µiτKiτ
∧ Lˆ ≥
∑
τ6t
∑
i
µiτ Lˆiτ , µiτ ≥ 0∀i, τ}
This is the Farrell technology cone. The upper boundary of the set is the best
practice production frontier. It is typical that not all the decision making units
produce on the technology set boundaries. In other words, such DMU’s are inef-
ficient as they are producing same output using more inputs. The Farrell output
1As in macroeconomic literature, the standard approach assumes implicitly that labor with
different amounts of human capital, for example, skilled and unskilled labor are perfect substi-
tutes although there are some evidences that this might not be a good assumption [4, 107, 108].
2The world technology frontier, independently calculated in each time period, can implode
if the frontier defining countries experience the economic collapse. The difference between the
observed production and production possibilities is important as there may be many events that
can stop the countries from producing on the technology frontier. It is not possible to pin down
all the events where once discovered production efficiency is forgotten [71, 108, 122].
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based measure of technical efficiency for country i at time t is defined by:
E(Yit, Lˆit, Kit) = min
{
eit|〈Yit/eit, Lˆit, Kit〉 ∈ τt
}
This efficiency index is the inverse of the maximal proportional amount by which
the output Yit can be expanded while remaining technologically feasible, given the
input quantities Lˆit and Kit and the technology τt. It is less than or equal to
1 and it takes the value of 1 if and only if the it observation is on the period t
production frontier. Formally, the following linear programs are solved for every
decision making unit to calculate the efficiency estimates:
minimize eit s. t.
Yit
eit
6
∑
τ6t
∑
i
µiτYiτ
Kiτ >
∑
τ6t
∑
i
µiτKiτ
Lˆiτ >
∑
τ6t
∑
i
µiτ Lˆiτ
µiτ > 0 ∀i, τ
For every decision making unit these efficiency levels eit and the activity levels µiτ
are reported as the output of DEA analysis [80, 108].
2.2.3 Productivity Growth Decomposition
Since Data Envelopment Efficiency method explicitly allows for the possibility of
non-efficient production, catch up growth due to the efficiency improvements and
growth due to the innovations can be distinguished [123]. Research efforts are also
focused to investigate causes of productivity change and its decomposition. Fa¨re
et al.(1994) [80] showed how to account for the productivity changes over time
based on the Malmquist productivity index [57]. Kumar and Russel (KR) (2002)
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[134], under the assumption of constant returns to scale decomposed the changes
in income per worker into efficiency change, technological change and capital accu-
mulation components. Such decompositions promote better understanding of the
determinants of better performance and provide private and public sector man-
agers and planners with the valuable information.
2.2.3.1 Malmquist Productivity Index
Malmquist productivity indices were introduced by Caves et al.(1982) [57] and
they named it after Malmquist who proposed to use the ratios of distance func-
tions as input quantity indices. The output oriented augmentation is discussed
below.
The technology of production T (x) contains all technically feasible input- output
vectors for a certain production process[85].
T (x) = {y : (x, y) ∈ T}
For every x ∈ <N+ has output isoquants:
I(x) = {y : y ∈ T (x), ey /∈ T (x), e > 1}
The output efficient subsets are
E(x) =
{
y : y ∈ T (x), y′ /∈ T (x), y′ > y
}
where the three sets satisfy E(x) ⊆ I(x) ⊆ T (x).
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The Shephard (1971) [195] output distance function Do(x, y) is defined on tech-
nology T (x)
Do(x, y) = min {e : (x, y/e) ∈ T (x)}
For y ∈ T (x), Do(x, y) 5 1 and for y ∈ I(x), Do(x, y) = 1. Under standard as-
sumptions on T , the output distance function Do(x, y) is non-decreasing, convex
and homogeneous of degree +1 in y and is non-increasing in x.
In simple case of one input and output, productivity change is defined as ratios of
average products3 [78],
productivity change =
yt+1/xt+1
yt/xt
and can be expressed as the ratio of output distance functions under the constant
returns to scale.
yt+1/xt+1
yt/xt
=
(yt+1/xt+1)Do(1, 1)
(yt/xt)Do(0, 0)
=
Do(x
t+1, yt+1)
Do(xt, yt)
The two Malmquist (output oriented) productivity indices for the reference tech-
nology T t and T t+1 can be defined as [57]
M to =
Dto(x
t+1, yt+1)
Dto(x
t, yt)
M t+1o =
Dt+1o (x
t+1, yt+1)
Dt+1o (x
t, yt)
As in Fa¨re et al.(1992) [79] by taking the geometric mean of the two indices,
which is in the spirit of Fisher (1922) [84] who defined his ideal price index as the
3The Shepard output distance function allows to “aggregate” inputs and outputs, as a gen-
eralization of the production function to multiple outputs.
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geometric mean of the Laspeyers and Paasche indices:
Mo(x
t, yt, xt+1, yt+1) = (M to.M
t+1
o )
1/2 =
(
Dto(x
t+1, yt+1)
Dto(x
t, yt)
× D
t+1
o (x
t+1, yt+1)
Dt+1o (x
t, yt)
)1/2
By rearranging the above expression, component distance functions readily allow
identification of efficiency change and technological change that is a movement
towards the frontier and a shift in the frontier respectively:
Mo(x
t, yt, xt+1, yt+1) =
Dt+1o (x
t+1, yt+1)
Dto(x
t, yt)
×
(
Dto(x
t+1, yt+1)
Dt+1o (x
t+1, yt+1)
× D
t
o(x
t, yt)
Dt+1o (x
t, yt)
)1/2
so that Mo(x
t, yt, xt+1, yt+1) = EFFCH × TECH
The evaluation of the index and its components requires the solution of four linear
programming problems for each DMU, for each pair of year, t and t+ 1.
2.2.3.2 Quadripartite Decomposition
Under the constant returns to scale assumption the production process is expressed
in space (k, y) by a function y(k), where y = Y/Lˆ and k = K/Lˆ are the ratios of
output and capital to labor input measured in efficiency units, respectively [26].
The considered economy is assumed to produce output yb at a point b in the base
period using the capital intensity kb and output yc at point c in the current period
using capital intensity kc.
By definition output on the production frontier for the respective capital intensities
is given by y¯b(kb) = yb/eb and y¯c(kc) = yc/ec, where eb and ec are the respective
periods efficiency scores. The two periods income per worker is related by
yc
yb
=
ec
eb
y¯c(kc)
y¯b(kb)
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Multiplying both the numerator and the denominator by y¯b(kc) or y¯c(kb) and
rearranging the terms will result in the following equations, which under the Hicks-
neutral give the same results.
yc
yb
=
ec
eb
y¯c(kc)
y¯b(kc)
y¯b(kc)
y¯b(kb)
yc
yb
=
ec
eb
y¯c(kb)
y¯b(kb)
y¯c(kc)
y¯c(kb)
Graphically, as shown in figure 2.2, the proposed decomposition measures the
changes in efficiency as the catch-up movement from point b to point e, techno-
logical changes by shifts of the current frontier from point f to point h and the
capital accumulation effect by movements along the base period frontier from e to
f. The reverse decomposition from current period to base period is also possible
[123].
The Fisher ideal decomposition, which uses the geometric averages of the measures
of technological change and accumulation, is applied to avoid the ambiguity of
the path dependence (base period or current period frontier) or neutrality of the
technological change. Formally
yc
yb
=
ec
eb
(
y¯c(kc)
y¯b(kc)
y¯c(kb)
y¯b(kb)
)1/2(
y¯b(kc)
y¯b(kb)
y¯c(kc)
y¯c(kb)
)1/2
where the first term denotes efficiency change (EFF), second technological change
(TECH) and the third term gives the effect of the capital deepening (KACC).
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of Non-Parametric Growth Accounting. [122]
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The growth of the productivity yˆt = Yt/Lt can be decomposed into the growth of
output per efficiency unit of the labor and the growth of human capital as follows:
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where HACC is the human capital accumulation.
For the decomposition calculation the needed distance functions are be defined as:
Dbo(kb, yb) =
yb(kb)
y¯b(kb)
=
Yb(Kb, Lˆb)
Y¯b(Kb, Lˆb)
Dco(kc, yc) =
yc(kc)
y¯c(kc)
=
Yc(Kc, Lˆc)
Y¯c(Kc, Lˆc)
The additional distance functions giving the efficiency of today’s production in
reference to tomorrow’s technology frontier and the efficiency of tomorrow’s pro-
duction in reference to today’s technology frontier are needed. These distance
functions are also obtained by solving two additional linear programs.
Dco(kb, yb) =
yb(kb)
y¯c(kb)
Dbo(kc, yc) =
yc(kc)
y¯b(kc)
The first term defining efficiency in equation 2.1 in terms of distance function is
expressed below[122].
ec
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=
Dc(kc, yc)
Db(kb, yb)
The technological change can be written as:
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=
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The capital deepening effect can be expressed as:
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2.3 Data
The data for both, the determination of structural breaks and non-parametric
growth accounting, is taken from Penn World table version 9.0. PWT is being
the standard source of data on real GDP across countries. By making use of the
across countries collected prices in Benchmark year by International Comparisons
Program (ICP), PWT constructs the purchasing-power-parity exchange rates and
converts the GDP at national prices to a common currency - US dollars- thus
making them comparable across countries. The yearly data of percentage change
in real GDP per capita (rgdpna: Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices (in
mil. 2011 US dollar), and pop: Population in millions) for 180 countries from 1950
to 2014 with atleast 25 years of data to identify the genuine structural breaks in
growth series is used. Real GDP at national prices is used to identify the structural
breaks in growth series as it helps to compare the growth rates across countries.
The data for non-parametric growth accounting includes: Real GDP (rgdpo:
Output-side real GDP (at Chained PPPs in mil. US dollar)), physical capital
(rkna: Capital stock at constant 2011 national prices (in mil. 2011 US dollar)),
based on investment and prices of structures and equipment[82]), human capital
(hc: Index of human capital per person) based on years of schooling and returns
to education and labor (emp: Number of persons engaged (in millions)). Output
side real GDP is employed to compare relative productive capacity across coun-
tries and over time.
2.4 Results and Discussion
Based on the methodologies and data description in previous sections, the esti-
mated results are presented for the identified structural breaks in growth series
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and for the decomposition of productivity changes around the structural breaks,
respectively. The strucchange package in R statistical software is used to calculate
the candidate breaks using the Bai & Perron methodology. Moreover, for the non-
parametric growth accounting analysis the FEAR package, also in R statistical
software, is used.
2.4.1 Structural Breaks
The genuine structural breaks in the growth series of 180 countries are identified
by using a variant of unified Fit and Filter approach as discussed in section 2.2.1.
The number of breaks in the beginning and at the end of growth series is low by
construction due to the considered trimming factor. For the time series starting
from 1950 to 2014, the earliest possible break is 1958 (1956) and the latest is 2006
(2008), considering eight (six) years minimum duration4.
There are two salient features of the fit and filter methodology. Firstly, this tech-
nique allows to identify the break, whenever, there is a change in growth rates of
certain magnitude, whereas, in BP methodology the potential break is identified
as a break only when the change in growth is statistically significant, thus making
it difficult to identify breaks on fluctuating and volatile growth paths. Secondly,
due to an explicit recognition of non linearity in growth dynamics more breaks are
identified. The FF technique uses different filters for the potential breaks after con-
sidering the nature of last actual break. For instance, any up-break (down-break)
can be identified as the genuine break if it is 2 percentage point higher (lower) than
the previous growth regime. Kar et al.(2013) [121] argued that these are the real
miracles as for a developing country the crucial relevance of these transitions from
high to higher growth rates can be hardly overemphasized. Kar et al.(2013) [121]
showed that by using BP technique almost quarter of the breaks are identified from
4Appendix A.1 shows the list of considered countries with FF breaks (h=8)
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Europe, due to the nature of this methodology which picks up breaks more easily
from the steady growth series. Whereas, the FF methodology is more successful
in identifying the structural breaks in case of volatile and fluctuating growth series.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 compare the region-wise breaks identified using both FF and
BP methodologies considering the trimming factors 6 and 8 respectively5. In to-
tal, for both of the trimming factors (h = 6 and 8), the number of genuine breaks
estimated by using the FF technique (782+546=1328) are roughly 4 times more
than the breaks identified by BP methodology (180+154=344). The findings in
this study are in line with the previous researches in identifying more breaks for
the volatile growth series of African and Asian developing countries. The number
of breaks identified by FF approach for lower and lower middle income economies
in Africa and Asia are roughly four times more than the BP technique, showing
that the former approach supports recognition of the genuine breaks even in highly
fluctuating growth series. Moreover, for the developed economies of Europe with
relatively smooth growth series, the FF methodology assists in finding genuine
breaks accounting approximately 17% of the total breaks which are less as com-
pared to the BP technique (identifies more than 26% breaks).
5North America also includes Caribbean and Central American Countries.
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Figures 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 show the estimated de’cadel structural break results
summarized region-wise for positive and negative breaks. A break is said to be
positive if it is followed by the 2% increase in average growth rate compared to
the one before the break and vice versa. For growth regime lasting for the min-
imum period of 8 years, the number of positive breaks is 271 and the number of
up-breaks in case of h = 6 is 380. The studies by Berg et al.(2012) [44], Jones and
Olken (2008) [118], or by Kerekes (2011) [123] showed the concentration of breaks
in 1970s and 1980s and also found a significant majority of the breaks during this
period to be negative. The results in the present study show that about 40% of
the breaks for the considered time period come from these two decades. Moreover,
results for the decade 1970-79 show that the negative breaks exceed the positive
ones. The recorded number of negative breaks in 1970s is in accordance with the
happening of productivity slow down in the industrialized world. However, con-
trary to many previous studies the majority of breaks (for both h = 6 and h = 8)
during 1980s and 1990s are found to be positive which go with the findings of Kar
et al.(2013) [121]. The number of negative breaks exceed the up-breaks for the
years from 2000 to 2009, pertaining to the decline in economic activities, occurred
mainly in developed economies.
Figures 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 also show that African, South American and Oceania
regions experienced more growth accelerations than growth deceleration whereas,
for Asia the number of both positive and negative breaks are almost the same.
However, in Europe and North & Central American countries the number of neg-
ative breaks exceeds the positive breaks. The African economies showed stable
growth paths during 1950s with a few structural breaks. However, after 60’s the
deterioration in both economic and political situation led to slow growth, whereas,
from 1990s to present the African countries are showing sustained and increasing
growth rates with more positive leaps. The number of positive breaks during
1990’s for European countries is high. The treaty of European Union was signed
in 1992, moreover, the single market and its four freedoms (the free movement of
goods, services, people and money) were also settled in 1993. However, during
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the first decade of a new century the number of down-breaks exceed the positive
regime shifts in particular, for the trimming factor 6, which includes period of
financial crises, starting from summer 2007.
The regime shifts occur in all regions of the world and 58% of the total struc-
tural breaks occurred in Asia and Africa6. The table 2.2 shows the region wise
classification of the structural breaks considering the state of development of re-
spective countries for the trimming factor 8. The countries are categorized by
using United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development
Report. The human development index (HDI) is used as it consolidates the three
main aspects of human development and welfare. For instance, modest standard
of living is depicted by the level of Gross National Income per Capita. Ability to
acquire skills and knowledge is captured by using the mean and expected years
of schooling. Moreover, healthy and long life is reflected by life expectancy at
birth. The countries fall into four broad human development groups; very high
human development (vhd )with more than 0.80 index points, high human devel-
opment (hd) with more than 0.70 index points, medium human development (md)
with more than 0.55 index points and low human development (ld) with less than
0.55 index points. The African continent which is traditionally considered to have
unfathomable growth records shows more number of positive breaks, in total, as
compared to the developed economies of Europe and North & Central America
with more down breaks.
In lower part of table 2.2 the overall aggregates for various human development
levels are presented. Around 72% of total breaks occurred in the countries with
human development index below 0.80 (hd, md and ld) which is in accordance with
the fact that developing economies experience different growth regimes (acceler-
ations or deceleration) and frequently shift from one growth regime to another.
Moreover, for each medium human developed (md) country more than 68% of the
6Appendix A.2: State of Development (region-wise) Quadripartite Decomposition Indices
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breaks are positive, suggesting that its not the growth trap in which the md coun-
tries are stuck rather its the matter of sustainability of positive growth regime once
achieved [44, 105, 115]. However, for low human developed countries (ld), mainly
from Africa, the number of negative breaks exceed. There can be several reasons
for more negative growth transitions among ld countries, for instance, economic
and political situation, natural resource trap and reliance on foreign debt, etc.
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Table 2.2: State of Development and Structural Breaks (h=8)
Region VHD HD MD LD Total
Africa Positive 0 10 64 23 97
Negative 0 6 23 57 86
Total 0 16 87 80 183
No. of Countries 0 4 13 33 50
Asia Positive 16 25 24 2 67
Negative 25 22 16 4 67
Total 41 47 40 6 134
No. of Countries 14 16 16 2 48
Europe Positive 31 9 1 0 41
Negative 44 8 0 0 52
Total 75 17 1 0 93
No. of Countries 31 8 1 0 40
North & Positive 9 22 6 1 38
Central Negative 13 30 5 1 49
America Total 22 52 11 2 87
No. of Countries 9 15 4 1 29
South Positive 6 11 6 0 23
America Negative 4 11 3 0 18
Total 10 22 9 0 41
No. of Countries 2 6 2 0 10
Oceania Positive 3 2 0 0 5
Negative 2 1 0 0 3
Total 5 3 0 0 8
No. of Countries 2 1 0 0 3
Grand total Positive 65 79 101 26 271
Negative 88 78 47 62 275
Total 153 157 148 88 546
No. of Countries 58 50 36 36 180
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2.4.2 Non-Parametric Growth Accounting
After the identification of the structural breaks in growth series of the countries,
following calculations are done to get the quadripartite decomposition of the pro-
ductivity changes by using trimming factor 8. Due to data restrictions the total
number of countries considered in non- parametric growth analysis is 1447. The
inter-temporal variant of DEA, that takes into account all input- output bundles
until period t, is used, as it precludes the technological regress8. Consider the
break occurring in the year s. For every adjacent pair of years in five years before
and five years after the break in GDP growth series, the components of produc-
tivity growth, for instance, efficiency change, technological progress and changes
resulting from capital deepening and human capital accumulation are calculated.
The averages of growth factors for the period, five years before and five years
after the break, are calculated which are reduced by 1 and multiplied by 1009.
Finally, the overall averages of the components across the countries are obtained.
Moreover, the growth of human capital is calculated as the quotient of averages
five years after and five years before the breaks for each break. Thus, positive
(negative) values indicate increase (decrease) in the growth factors.
The summarized results of productivity growth decomposition around the up-
breaks are presented in the table 2.3. The first column shows the non-parametric
estimates of growth before the positive break, whereas, the second column shows
after the break estimations. The average GDP growth exhibits the positive jump of
7Due to missing data on human capital Aruba, Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Azerbaijan,
Bahamas, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Bermuda, Bhutan, British Virgin Islands, Comoros,
Cape Verde, Cayman Islands, Chad, Djibouti, Dominica, Georgia, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Grenada, Lebanon, Macedonia, Montenegro, Montserrat, Oman, State of Pales-
tine, Sao Tome & Principe, Seychelles, Suriname, St.Kitts & Nevis, St.Lucia, St.Vincent, Turks
and Caicos Islands, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are excluded from the further analysis.
8The results presented here are calculated by using the preceding five years input-output
bundles.
9For example, if the break is in year 1970, the regime before and after the break is g66,....,g70
and g71,...., g75, respectively where g66 is the growth in 1965-1966
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approximately 5% after the up-break. Other components are also increasing pos-
itively after the positive breaks. The efficiency change contribution to observed
growth rate gets positive after the break. The difference in the percentage points
between the regimes is 3.13 and 0.50 for efficiency and technological changes, re-
spectively. In case of up-breaks efficiency improvements contribute more than half
of the total productivity growth. Moreover, capital deepening contributes posi-
tively by more than one percentage point after the regime change. The impact of
human capital accumulation growth is also positive on productivity growth. The
positive change of about 40% in productivity growth after growth acceleration is
contributed by the latter two factors.
Table 2.4 presents the summarized results of productivity growth decomposition
around the down-breaks. The GDP growth rate falls from 6.97 to 2.61 between
the regimes. The negative efficiency before the down break, tends to be more neg-
ative after the deceleration in growth series. Technological change also contributes
negatively to productivity growth after the down breaks and its share (more than
25%) is relatively higher than the up-breaks. The growth contribution of the capi-
tal deepening is fallen from 5.42 to 4.34 percentage points after the negative breaks
and causes decline in productivity growth. However, the growth of human capital
accumulation tends to effect productivity growth positively.
Figures 2.9, and 2.10 presents the calculations for positive and negative regime
shifts, respectively, by plotting the four productivity component growth rates
against the year of break (five years averages before and after the breaks reduced
by one and multiplied by 100). Panel a of figure 2.9 shows efficiency improvements
at the occurrence of positive structural breaks. Moreover, in panel c the techno-
logical progress before and after the up-breaks suggests positive role of it. Ample
dispersion of capital deepening and human capital accumulation is highlighted in
panel b and panel d, respectively. However, their role get enhanced and more
positive at the break points. The contribution of technical efficiency tends to be
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Table 2.3: Positive breaks and Non-Parametric Growth Accounting
Before After Difference
GDP growth 1.83 6.89 5.06
Efficiency change -1.86 1.27 3.13
Technological change 1.01 1.51 0.50
Capital deepening 2.77 4.08 1.31
Human capital accumulation 1.16
Observations 224 224
Figures are reported as an overall average across the countries
which are reduced by 1 and multiplied by 100.
more negative at the down-breaks as depicted in the figure 2.10 panel a. The
technological changes, presented in panel c, also tends to effect the productivity
change negatively. Again in panel b and panel d, there are wide dispersion of
contributions of human and capital accumulation, respectively. The role of cap-
ital deepening tends to be less positive at the down-breaks, whereas, the human
capital accumulation effects productivity growth positively.
The respective importance of efficiency and technological changes, capital deep-
ening and human capital accumulation for growth regime changes (up-breaks and
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Table 2.4: Negative Breaks and Non-Parametric Growth Accounting
Before After Difference
GDP growth 6.97 2.61 -4.36
Efficiency change -0.45 -2.75 -2.30
Technological change 2.04 1.18 -0.86
Capital deepening 5.42 4.34 -1.08
Human capital accumulation 1.17
Observations 225 225
Figures are reported as an overall average across the countries
which are reduced by 1 and multiplied by 100.
down-breaks for trimming factor 8) of 144 countries at different states of human
development is summarized in Table 2.510. It shows that among various group of
countries the sources of growth vary. The first part of table 2.5 deals with the up-
breaks. More than one third of a productivity change is contributed by the total
factor accumulation for all the states of development. The finding is quasi in line
with the calculations of Henderson and Russell (2005) [108], who found that more
than half of the mean productivity growth is attributed to the factor productivity
10The calculated differences are reported, by using the averages five years after and five years
before the breaks which are reduced by 1 and multiplied by 100.
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growth.They also pointed out that more than half of physical capital accumula-
tion share in productivity growth, as highlighted by KR, was in-fact the result of
human capital accumulation. In all the groups of countries the efficiency improve-
ments followed by capital deepening and human capital accumulation contribute
to growth acceleration. The growth improvements in ld countries is relatively
more, about 62%, due to the efficiency improvements as compared to rest of the
considered countries (accounting to forty percent and more). This shows the key
importance of the reallocation of resources to positive growth spells. However, as
described by Hausmann et al.(2005) [105] such changes are not enough to forecast
positive growth without further information and explanations. Rodrick (2005)
[185] also highlighted the fact that initializing of growth acceleration is different
from sustaining it. The number of positive breaks for developing countries con-
clude that growth acceleration is conceivable by them and they are not stuck in
the poverty trap. The problem is rather associated with their inability to sustain
the growth accelerations. The growth rate after up-breaks is less explained by the
technological changes particularly for md and ld countries, however, this confirms
the finding of Kumar and Russel (2002)(KR) [134] that technological change is
palpably non-neutral.
The lower panel of the table 2.5 presents the results for down-breaks at differ-
ent states of human development. The decline in efficiency contributes mainly in
growth deceleration for all states of development. The technological progress also
plays negative role, moreover, its contribution in case of down-breaks is relatively
higher for all states of development, except for less human developed countries, as
compared to the positive breaks. The slower capital accumulation for all states of
human development plays a negative role. However, as in the case of up-breaks the
role of human capital accumulation in down-breaks is positive too. It is also rela-
tively higher for the developing countries as compared to the developed economies,
possibly due to more contribution of the workers in labor market to cope up with
the individual income losses during the growth deceleration [123]. The contribu-
tion of total factors of productivity is less in down-breaks as compared to their
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share in positive growth transitions.
Figures 2.11, and 2.12 present the decade-wise decomposition of productivity
growth components sorted on regional basis for up and down breaks with trim-
ming factor 8. For almost all the decades efficiency improvements (decline) effect
the productivity growth positively (negatively). The technological change for the
positive breaks during the 70’s decade for all regions show negative impact on
productivity growth. Based on the existing literature, the reasons behind this
productivity slow down, could be the less share of traditional industrial setup,
which was established mostly for the private consumption during that period.
Moreover, the technological improvements, in the beginning, require more funds,
investments, research, resources and also need some time to reap benefits. Besides,
with the new technological improvements, the level of employment, considered to
be one of the major measure of growth, did not increase rapidly which effects the
economy negatively.
2.4.3 Discussion
There exists a large empirical literature that tried to identify the shifts in growth
series. The literature can be classified using either of the two distinct approaches.
Firstly, the subjective methodology, which defines the thresholds to determine the
transitions in growth regime known as a filter approach ( Hausmann et al.(2005)).
Secondly, the statistical approach which uses estimation and testing procedure
(Bai & Perron test) to identify the statistically significant breaks, for instance,
studies done by Jones and Olken (2008) [118], Berg et al.(2012) [44] and Kerekes
(2011) [123]. This research work uses a variant of unified approach known as Fit
and Filter methodology, proposed by Kar et al.(2013) [121], to identify the tran-
sitions in growth regimes (both positive and negative). This technique combines
both the aforementioned approaches to identify the break in growth series. This
methodology helps to avoid weaknesses of the previous approaches. Firstly, by
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Table 2.5: Development State and Non-parametric Growth Accounting
Positive breaks
VHD HD MD LD
GDP growth 5.37 5.34 4.63 4.81
Efficiency change 3.29 2.65 2.89 3.68
Technological change 0.84 0.96 0.00 0.11
Capital deepening 1.12 1.60 1.66 0.89
Human capital
accumulation
1.10 1.14 1.19 1.21
Observations 58 60 49 57
Down-breaks
GDP growth -3.93 -4.72 -4.88 -4.24
Efficiency change -1.56 -2.18 -2.90 -3.03
Technological change -1.59 -0.90 -0.41 -0.10
Capital deepening -0.74 -1.57 -1.14 -0.99
Human capital
accumulation
1.10 1.16 1.25 1.24
Observations 76 56 38 55
Figures are reported as an overall average across the countries. Here
the difference figures, before and after the breaks, are reported.
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avoiding inconsistencies and ad-hoc nature of filter approach. Secondly, by over-
coming the problem of low statistical power of the BP methodology, which leads
to the acceptance (rejection) of the structural breaks even when they are false
(true) breaks. Larger number of candidate breaks is found by using FF technique
from 180 countries data on GDP per capita growth for a period of 1950-2014 than
by employing the pure statistical BP approach. Moreover, as compared to other
studies which used pure statistical approach, more breaks are identified from the
volatile growth series pertaining to the developing countries in general by applying
FF methodology. The employed approach in this work also helps to identify the
breaks leading countries to the higher levels of growth from previous high growth
spans (rapid or miracle growth) and vice versa.
Total number of 546 structural breaks are found (271 positive and 275 negative
in case of h = 8). The up-breaks are more common in the lower income, lower
middle economies and upper middle income (193 up-breaks, h=8), contrary to
the high income economies11. This confirms that the developing countries do not
remain in the poverty trap, however, the sustainability of the positive growth once
achieved is crucial. The variant of FF technique used in this paper helps to iden-
tify more number of breaks which are described as the “true negative” problems of
the statistical approach. Moreover, as it is difficult for countries to show positive
break following the growth acceleration or a down break following a growth decel-
eration, the adopted approach recognizes the non-linearity in the growth process.
Thus, enabling periodization of growth regimes consistent with the historical un-
derstanding of economic growth across countries [121].
After the identification of structural breaks by using the unified FF technique
in growth series, productivity growth is decomposed into the technical catch-up,
technological progress and factor accumulation using a non-parametric growth
11The countries are categorized by using World Bank GNI per Capita Operational Guidelines
& Analytical Classifications (Year 2014)
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accounting approach. Previous literature generally suggested that the non- para-
metric growth accounting approach tends to find more impact of factor accumu-
lation on productivity growth than its sources. However, the results in this work
suggest that the non-parametric growth accounting tends to find role of factor
accumulation along-with the sources of productivity growth. The calculated re-
sults show that the driving forces for growth accelerations and deceleration are
efficiency changes along-with factors accumulation. Furthermore, the findings are
partially in line with the results of Henderson and Russell (2005) [108] and Jerz-
manowski (2006) [115]. The contribution of efficiency improvements in up-breaks
and growth accelerations is dominant. The role of factor accumulation is also
important, where in case of the up-breaks, the share of human capital accumula-
tion is more than 45% of the contribution of factors accumulation in productivity
growth. As pointed by Henderson and Russell (2005) [108], these results suggest
the importance of capital deepening and human capital accumulation on produc-
tivity growth. The key player in the growth slow down is decline in efficiency
followed by the negative impact of capital deepening. However, the magnitude of
the contribution of factor accumulation in both positive and negative regimes is
different. For positive breaks it accounts for more than 40% whereas, it is only 3%
in growth deceleration. This asymmetry requires separate modeling frameworks
for positive and negative growth transitions. In case of down-breaks the role of
technological change is relatively higher as compared to the up-breaks.
Considering the human development state of countries the role of efficiency tends
to be dominant in both up and down breaks. In case of positive growth breaks the
role of technological improvements is really meager and rather irrelevant for low
and middle states of human development economies. However, for very high and
high human development countries its role is positive and relatively high. In case
of down-breaks, when the total impact of factor accumulation is taken into ac-
count, the contribution of technological decline gains relevance for the very high,
high and medium human development countries. For low human development
countries (ld) the major participant in the growth shifts (positive and negative) is
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efficiency change. In this case, resource reallocation tends to be the most crucial
aspect as it guides the lds to stay on positive growth track or helps to get out
of the negative growth paths. However, this area requires further research and
analysis, to be conducted on the individual countries, to figure out the suitable
strategies and implementable policies.
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2.5 Conclusions
The approach employed in this paper pays attention to the shifts in growth per-
formance and the mystery of growth transition within a country and highlights
the fact that average growth rates can mask very distinct growth paths. The cur-
rent work also deals with the changes in productivity growth as a main source of
growth regime transitions. The structural breaks in growth series are identified
using the variant of unified fit and filter approach. This methodology allows to
overcome the weaknesses of both statistical and filter based approaches. The iden-
tified structural breaks in growth series are used to decompose the productivity
changes into efficiency and technological changes, capital deepening and human
capital accumulation. The proximate sources of growth are determined by using
non-parametric growth accounting technique, which requires fewer assumptions
than the parametric growth accounting. Particularly, the functional form of the
production function is not defined because of which the elasticity of substitution
between the variables is estimated by the data, and also the market structure as-
sumptions are not needed.
This paper confirms the findings of Jones and Olken (2008) [118] that capital deep-
ening is not the main driver in growth rate changes. However, regarding human
capital accumulation the results are in line with Henderson and Russel (2005) [108]
findings who found that more than half of the increase in the mean productivity,
attributed by KR to the physical capital accumulation, is in-fact due to the human
capital accumulation. Following the conclusions by Jones and Olken (2008) and
Kerekes (2011), the results also suggest that both positive and negative breaks are
asymmetric, as in case of up-breaks the sources leading to productivity growth
are mixed with efficiency improvements (as a main participant) followed by fac-
tor accumulation. However, in case of down-breaks the productivity slow-down
is mainly the result of decline in efficiency. Moreover, the contribution of capi-
tal accumulation in both cases is substantially the same but in opposite directions.
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In case of developing countries the role of efficiency is really important. Therefore,
the reallocation of the resources can lead to growth improvements. Although, im-
provement in efficiency, only, is not sufficient to predict about the future growth
[105], it can be one direction to work on. By reallocating the resources of produc-
tion efficiently, at some point the country can switch to either capital accumulation
or technological improvements (innovations). The poor countries inability to sus-
tain the positive breaks in growth can be the reason to not to undergo this change
[185].
The direction of further research can be the in-depth analysis of the individual
sources of productivity growth. As the results show that growth transition is
mostly dominated by the efficiency change, next step can be the study of sources
of efficiency change. The more thorough understanding of the determinants and
sources of the production efficiency can help to identify the reasons of poverty
of countries and guide the way to make suitable policies for countries to get on
prosperity track.
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Figure 2.3: Fit & Filter vs Bai & Perron Breaks (h=6)
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Figure 2.4: Fit & Filter vs Bai & Perron Breaks (h=8)
Afri
ca
Asi
a
Eur
ope
Nor
th A
mer
ica
Oce
ania
Sou
th A
mer
ica
020406080100120140
(Po
sitiv
e B
rea
ks, 
h=8
)
Afri
ca
Asi
a
Eur
ope
Nor
th A
mer
ica
Oce
ania
Sou
th A
mer
ica
020406080100120140
 FF
 
 BP
(Ne
gat
ive 
Bre
aks
, h=
8)
48 Chapter 2 Structural Breaks in Growth Series, . . .
Figure 2.5: Decade-wise Regional Positive Breaks (h=6)
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Figure 2.6: Decade-wise Regional Negative Breaks (h=6)
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Figure 2.7: Decade-wise Regional Positive Breaks (h=8)
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Figure 2.8: Decade-wise Regional Negative Breaks (h=8)
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Figure 2.9: Quadripartite Indexes: Positive Breaks (h=8)
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Figure 2.10: Quadripartite Indexes: Negative Breaks (h=8)
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Figure 2.11: Decade-wise Regional Quadripartite Decomposition Indexes
(positive breaks, h=8)
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Figure 2.12: Decade-wise Regional Quadripartite Decomposition Indexes
(negative breaks, h=8)
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Chapter 3
Nation’s Progress and its
Determinants: A Two-Stage
Approach
Nation’s progress is an essential element in growth theory and it measures the
performance of a country which is not exclusively based on economic factors but
also on social, environmental and human welfare variables. The aim of this study
is to examine the influence of the potential economic, institutional, demographic
and geographic determinants on the progress of a nation. The performance of a
nation is measured as an estimated efficiency score within which it transforms a
given number of endowments such as human and physical capital into national
well-being and general human welfare. The economic, environmental and human
well-being yardsticks, namely GDP per capita, persons employed, carbon dioxide
emission and availability of clean water with proper sanitation facilities are used
to measure the nation’s progress. The estimated bias adjusted performance scores
in stage 1 are regressed on the potential covariates. Simar and Wilson’s double
bootstrap procedure is used, which allows valid inferences in the presence of an
unknown serial correlation in the efficiency scores. The second stage results reveal
that the considered covariates play a significant role in the progress of a nation.
58 Chapter 3 Nation’s progress and its determinants,. . .
3.1 Introduction
There is a long history of economic growth and development analysis of countries
and regions and also distribution of the outcomes of economic activity among pop-
ulation. In a neoclassical economic framework, Solow (1956)[206] argued that the
growth rate of a region, measured in term of per capita income, is inversaly related
to its initial per capita income thus giving positive future perspective for poor
regions. Many interesting and important qualitative researches were prompted
pertaining to the idea of convergence(see [35]). In general measurement of the
performance of a country is becoming fundamental for economic development and
policy making whereby the assessment of progress is done mostly in terms of
GDP. However, this approach is often strongly criticized as GDP per capita is
not able to measure the inequalities in terms of different dimensions of the well-
being among nations[65]. Moreover, GDP is only the proxy or partial measure
of multi-dimensional population well-being theme, which simultaneously includes
both economic and non-economic aspects of societies.
During recent years the analysis of nation’s progress and national well-being of
different countries and geographical regions is becoming one of the most impor-
tant areas of interest. Progress can be described as better and improved well-being
of people and households and its assessment requires to look into the diverse ex-
periences and living conditions of people along with the functioning of economic
system. There is an increased awareness that the macro economic statistics, such
as GDP, do not show the clear and enhanced picture of the ordinary people liv-
ing conditions and experiences. Kuznets (1973)[135] asserted the expansion of
the national accounting framework considering both certain costs (such as pollu-
tion, urban concentration, commuting, etc.) and positive returns (such as better
health, longer life, more comfort and leisure, less income inequalities, etc.). David-
son (2000)[68] in his publication ”You can’t eat GNP” presented the hypothesis
that GNP (or GDP per capita) cannot be considered as the only performance
indicator of a nation as it does not capture the overall well-being. Moreover, the
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economic and financial crisis over the past few years enlightened the policy makers
that the economic indicators alone cannot capture the full realm of human costs
of the crises.
There are a few new attempts in the literature since 1990s to measure the progress
of a nation by using more appropriate variables and indicators. World Bank’s hu-
man development index (HDI), a composite indicator, based on GDP per capita,
the adult literacy rate and life expectancy was introduced describing the indi-
vidual’s access to financial resources, basic educational opportunities and health
facilities. However, HDI is criticized because of the high correlation between GDP
and the various important background variables and simple weighting of indica-
tors. Hobijn and Franses (2001)[111] highlighted the need to evaluate the nation’s
progress to encircle the relevant measures living standards. They showed in their
study that the convergence in GDP does not imply convergence of the living stan-
dards. Moreover, there is a growing interest particularly in the European Union
to compare progress and performances of its member countries and to encourage
them to find the methods to improve their efficiency and national well-being. The
progress of societies and measurement of well-being of people is becoming the key
priority for OECD. Over the last 10 years, OECD has been considering the diverse
experiences and living standards of people and households beyond focusing on the
functioning of economic system. The OECD’s Measuring the Progress of Soci-
eties is headed in this direction. The objective of the conference on Beyond GDP
in November 2007, hosted by the European Commission, European Parliament,
Club of Rome, OECD and WWF, was to clarify the indexes which are most ap-
propriate to measure progress and their integration in the decision making process.
For the measurement of national progress many ways are being suggested, devel-
oped and used. These methodologies can be categorized into the following four
groups. Firstly, corrected GDP and SNA accounts, such as Sustainable Economic
Welfare Index, Green GDPs, Genuine Wealth and the Genuine Progress Indicator
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(GPI), where GDP and national accounts are used as the foundation and then
the indicators of economic well-being are added or subtracted. However, these
measures have limitations as well for instance; the lack of consensus of valuation
of the non monetary items and the involved subjectivity. Secondly, the indexes
that do not use GDP and measure directly the aspects of well-being. These in-
dexes include Ecological Footprint (EF), Subjective Well-Being (SWB) and Gross
National Happiness (GNH), but lack the specifically defined procedure of mea-
surement. Thirdly, the composite indexes, which use both the national accounts
or GDP and non-GDP social or environmental indexes, for example, Human De-
velopment Index (HDI), Happy Planet Index (HPI). Fourthly, indicator suites in
which the well- being variables are reported separately. United Nations (UN) di-
vision for Sustainable Development provides a large set of such indicators. Millen-
nium Development Goals and Indicators, National Income Satellite Accounts and
Calvert-Henderson Quality of life indicators are some examples in this category[64].
However, there are some restrictions and barriers to the measurement of Nation’s
progress. The reliable data on the well-being indicators over a period of time is not
available or partially missing. There is also a lack of consensus over the importance
of the indicators and their selection. Moreover, there is also a global resistance to
change the paradigm thinking that GDP growth alone is enough for improvement
in human well-being. Due to data limitations these studies are generally limited
to the OECD countries. Giles and Feng (2005)[90] analysed 14 OECD countries
considering five measures of well-being: the GINI index of income inequality, the
rate of poverty, the rate of tertiary education participation, expectancy of life and
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). Cracolici et al. (2009)[65] suggested that the
selection of the indicators should be based on the characteristics of the countries
(developed or developing, low, medium or high income, etc.), and on the capacity
of the indicators to capture the relative heterogenity among countries. Hosseini
and Kaneko (2011)[112] used 29 institutional, environmental, economic and so-
cial variables for 131 countries to derive sustainability indices and attempted to
rank the countries on the bases of their Sustainable Development Indexes (SDI).
3.1 Introduction 61
The innovative economic historians suggested an alternative approach of using the
anthropometric indicators, which includes height, weight or rate of mortality[129–
131]. Herrmann et al. (2008)[109] tried to rank or categorize countries with their
welfare regimes. They distinguished among different kinds of social states. For
instance, the new European state model is compared with the Scandinavian model
using an index number approach or factor analysis.
In current analysis for measuring nation’s progress and well-being the indicators
from the three dimensions, namely Economic well-being, Environmental well-being
and Human well-being are considered. GDP per capita and the number of persons
employed, represent the economic activities. There is an increased recognition over
the period of time that for measuring nation’s progress quality of environment is of
great importance. For environmental well-being Carbon Dioxide (CO2) emissions
(metric tons per capita) is considered. Dasgupta et al. (2006)[67] showed that
the argument of famous Kuznets curve (EKC), which predicted that in developing
countries pollution increases until a certain level of income, is incorrect. They
suggested that even in the overcrowded poor countries the environmental gover-
nance is also possible, thereby reducing air pollution. This makes it important to
consider the environment well-being in measuring nation’s progress. Human well-
being is measured by considering the indicators representing basic needs, which
are an access of the population to clean water sources and improved sanitation
facilities. The approach, used in this work, measures nation’s progress by estimat-
ing the relationship between the resources that a country possesses (inputs) and
its actual achieved level of well-being (output). The main idea is to measure the
success of a country by the highest amount of output it has produced using the
given inputs.
There is a wide range of literature examining the determinants of the economic
performance. These studies, by using different conceptual and methodological
frameworks, emphasized various sets of explanatory factors and highlighted the
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sources of economic growth. In spite of the lack of unified theory, there are two
distinguished mainstream strands, that describe the role of various determinants
of economic growth and well-being[25]. First, the neoclassicals (Solow 1956[206])
who highlighted the importance of capital accumulation. Second, is the endoge-
nous growth theory (Romer 1986[187] and 1990[188], Lucas 1988[144]) which drew
attention towards human capital and innovation. Another strand, the New Eco-
nomic Geography (NEG), explained the spatial characteristics of development and
economic growth. This approach exerted that economic growth is an unbalance
process which favors the already advanced countries (Krugman 1991[133], Fujita
et al. 1999[87]. Other theoretical approaches stressed out the important role
of non- economic factors in economic performance. Institutional economics em-
phasized the role of institutions (North 1990[164] and Me´nard and Shirley[154]).
Importance of socio-cultural factors is highlighted by social economics (Granovet-
ter 1985[94], Knack and Keefer 1995[127]). From political science such as Lipset
(1959)[143] and Brunetti (1997)[52] focused on the political determinants. The
role of Geographic and Demographic factors are also stressed for the national per-
formance (Gallup et al. 1999[88], Brander and Dowrick 1994[50], Kalemli-Ozcan
2002[120]).
Following the theoretical developments, the empirical researches at first, mostly
focused on the economic convergence testing the validity of neoclassical and en-
dogenous growth theory. Later, the studies turned attention towards the deter-
minants of economic performance. With the development of larger and richer
databases, for instance, Penn World Tables and better econometric and statistical
techniques, such as cross sectional and panel data analysis, the determination of
factors of economic well-being and growth is done more precisely and with more
accuracy. However, due to varying theoretical frameworks used by the empiri-
cal researches, the results and findings differ, and standard conclusions are not
fully established. Many studies distinguished between proximate and fundamen-
tal sources of growth (Rodrik 2003[184], Snowdon 2004[205] and Acemoglu et al.
2005[3]). The proximate sources of growth refer to capital accumulation, labor
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and technology, whereas the fundamental sources include institutions, political
systems, socio-cultural variables, demographic and geographic factors.
In this research work, the two stage DEA approach is used to analyze the im-
pact of various economic and non-economic factors on the nation’s performance.
The national well-being (efficiency scores) is calculated in the first stage using the
non-parametric methodology which constructs the efficient frontier with the best
performing observations (countries) of the sample. In the second stage, these esti-
mates are regressed against a set of explanatory variables to find their impact on
nation’s progress. Simar and Wilson (2007, 2011)[197, 202] identified the serious
limitations with a two-step DEA approach. They argued that a two-stage proce-
dure does not consider the underlying data generating process (DGP). This casts
statistical doubts on the meaning of the estimates produced to explain efficiency.
They showed that the statistical inference approaches used in a conventional two-
stage DEA procedure are invalid statistically, as the DEA efficiency estimates are
serially correlated. They developed a double bootstrap procedure (also used in
this work) which gives consistent inferences within the DEA models.
Recent studies in this field investigated the performance of a country and the fac-
tors influencing progress by using different conceptual and methodological frame-
works and emphasized different set of factors and sources of economic growth.
Blum (2012)[49] estimated the government efficiency scores for 62 countries on
decade basis between 1850s and 1980s and stated that mono-cultures and redis-
tribution increase efficiency, whereas the effect of the population heterogeneity is
negative. Afonso et al. (2010)[7], while examining the public sector efficiency in
the new EU member states, concluded that the competence of civil service and
high education levels of population as well as the security of property rights seem
to facilitate the prevention of inefficiencies in the public sector and provide an
“extra boost” to public expenditure efficiency. Hauner (2008)[103] concluded that
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higher per capita income, smaller share of federal transfers in substantial govern-
ment revenue, better governance, smaller government expenditure and stronger
democratic control tend to influence the Russian performance. Hauner and Kyobe
(2010)[104] examined the impact of spending on government efficiency. They con-
cluded that there is a negative relationship between efficiency and spending. They
also presented that the improved institutions, particularly government account-
ability and corruption control impact the state performance positively. La Porta
et al.(1999)[136] empirically investigated the quality of government in a large cross
section of countries. They found that the countries which are close to equator,
ethno-linguistically diverse, poor, having high proportions of Catholics or Mus-
lims and use the interventionist legal system such as the French or Socialist civil
laws exhibit inferior government performance. Moreover, they also stated that the
larger governments tend to perform better.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in following manners. Firstly,
the cross-country panel data-set containing 82 countries covering all income levels
from 1990 to 2014 is used1 to measure the national performance. Moreover, na-
tion’s progress is measured by using three dimensions of growth namely, economic,
environmental and human well-being. Secondly, this study offers methodological
improvements by using Simar and Wilson (2007) double bootstrap approach. This
helps to produce bias corrected performance score enabling the consistent and re-
liable estimates of determinants of nation’s progress2. Thirdly, much broader uni-
verse of the regressors, which includes economic, institutional, demographic and
geographic variables is used.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2 theoretical and
methodological basis of a two stage bootstrap data envelopment analysis is dis-
cussed. Data sources and illustration are presented in section 3.3. In section 3.4
1List of the countries given in Appendix B.
2The package ”rDEA” in R Statistical Software is used.
3.2 Methodology 65
the estimated results are presented and discussed: the first stage results are based
on the computation of the bias adjusted DEA efficiency scores, while the explo-
ration of the potential determinants of nation’s progress is performed in the second
stage. The conclusions are presented in last section 3.5.
3.2 Methodology
The methodological focus is based on the assessment of the nation’s progress
scores, where they are not taken in absolute terms but as performance relative
to an efficient technology production frontier. The efficient frontier is estimated
through DEA which is a very useful tool in efficiency measurement. In particular
it helps to overcome the weakness of the regression techniques restricting to only
one yardstick. In regression techniques to measure the government efficiency, one
output (say life expectancy) is regressed on its determinants (inputs, GDP/c etc.,)
and the resulting residuals are interpreted as efficiency. Whereas, DEA allows the
researchers to work with the multiple inputs and multiple outputs at the same time.
Non parametric efficiency frontier assumes no particular form and depends on the
general reliability properties; such as monotonicity, convexity and homogeneity.
Conditional on the data for the observed units (countries here) DEA methodol-
ogy is based on linear programming algorithm used to estimate the true but not
observable production frontier.
DEA models can be specified either from an input or output oriented perspective.
In the input oriented model the efficiency scores show the proportion to which
inputs have to be reduced to have decision making unit (DMU) on the efficiency
frontier. Whereas, in the output oriented model the scores show the proportion by
which output has to be increased to reach the frontier. In this work, the output
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oriented model under the assumption of variable returns to scale is applied.
The Farrell’s definition of efficiency is used. Kneip et al. (1998) [128] described
all the assumptions required to derive consistency and convergence speed of the
Farrell’s estimated efficiency scores with the multiple inputs and multiple outputs
(multivariate case). The rate of convergence depends upon the number of inputs
and outputs. The higher the number, the slower the convergence rate. Also the
convergence of the efficiency scores depends on the degree of the smoothness of
the true frontier. Moreover, the efficiency scores are serially correlated in an un-
known fashion, therefore standard inference approaches are not appropriate. A
naive bootstrap is also inconsistent in case of non-parametric efficiency estima-
tion [128, 199–201]. To successfully deal with the above mentioned problems in a
two-stage DEA with covariates, Simar and Wilson (2007)[202] suggested a double
bootstrap based on a well described statistical model.
The Data generating process (DGP) needs to be defined in order to study the
properties of a DEA estimator. A set of assumptions are formulated by Simar
(1996)[196] and Simar and Wilson (1998)[198] to define DGP. Within a two stage
DEA, a bootstrap method is described by Simar and Wilson (2007)[202] to achieve
bias corrected efficiency estimates and to approximate the asymptotic distribu-
tion. For a two stage procedure the DGP in the second stage presented by them
is logically consistent with regressing non-parametric DEA efficiency scores on co-
variates that are different from the inputs used to measure the performance in the
first stage. It also accounts for censoring the dependent variable (the estimated
efficiency scores) i. e. due to the lumpiness (many values to 1) and is suitable for
the two stage method[18]. They also highlighted the separability conditions.
The production process is constrained by the production set:
ϕ = {(x, y) ∈ RN+M+ |x can produce y}
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where x represents a vector of N inputs and y a vector of M outputs.
The boundary of ϕ is the production frontier. The technically efficient units are
operating on the production frontier, whereas the technically inefficient units are
in the interior of ϕ . For all x ∈ RN+ , the required output set is:
Y (x) = {y ∈ RM+ | (x, y) ∈ ϕ}
Then for a given x ∈ RN+ , the ∂Y (x) (the output oriented efficiency boundary) is
defined as:
∂Y (x) = {y|y ∈ Y (x), µy /∈ Y (x),∀µ > 1}
For a production unit located at (x, y) ∈ RN+M+ (x, y) the output measure of effi-
ciency is:
µ(x, y) = max{µ|(x, µy) ∈ ϕ}
As in practice the production set ϕ is unobservable, DEA estimators are used to
get the efficiency scores µ(x, y). For output orientation with variable returns to
scale the following linear program is used to get the solution.
µˆV RS(x, y) = max{µ| µyi 6
n∑
i=1
γiyi;xi >
n∑
i
γixi;
n∑
i
γi = 1; γi > 0, i = 1, ..., n} (3.1)
where 1 6 µˆi.
Countries are technically efficient when µˆi = 1 and are inefficient when µˆi >
1. µˆi − 1 is the proportional increase in outputs that could be achieved by the
ith country with constant held input quantities, γ is a non negative intensity
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variable used to scale individual observed activities for constructing piece-wise
linear technology [31]. In the second stage, the estimated efficiency scores are
employed as the dependent variable µˆi, regressing them on potential exogenous
(environmental) variables zi
µˆi = ziβ + i (3.2)
where zi is the vector of variables assumed to impact the choice and use of y and
x, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and i is an independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) continuous random variable which is distributed N(0, σ2 )
with left truncation at 1− ziβ, for each i, and assumed to be independent of zi3.
Simar and Wilson (2000)[201] observed that µˆi is a downward biased estimator of
µi, as the countries that determine the frontier in reality may not be included in
the sample used, and thus the potential output increase of the country might be
greater than the estimated DEA scores[31]. Couple of problems arise, firstly, due
to the fact that the true DEA scores are unobserved and the replaced estimated
scores µˆi are serially correlated in an unknown way and, secondly, the error term
i is correlated with zi since the inputs and outputs can be correlated with the
environmental variables[214]. In order to obtain unbiased β coefficients and valid
confidence intervals the bootstrap procedure of Simar and Wilson (2007)[202] is
used in this work. The package ”rDEA” in R Statistical Software is used which
implements the Simar and Wilson’s (2007) second algorithm for obtaining bias
corrected efficiency scores in output oriented DEA model.
The Double Bootstrap
3The distribution for i is restricted by i > (1− ziβ) as in the output oriented approach the
efficiency scores are larger than or equal to one.
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Assuming that the DGP can be simulated by taking the pseudo data set drawn
from the original sample generated by the DGP. The DEA efficiency scores are re-
estimated using the pseudo data. An empirical distribution of the bootstrap values
is obtained by repeating this process number of times. This gives Monte Carlo
sampling distribution approximation and facilitates the inference procedures. The
performance of bootstrap methodology and statistical inference reliability crucially
depend on how well it characterizes the true DGP and on the re-sampling simula-
tion accuracy to copy the DGP[31]. The procedure consists of the following seven
steps with two sub-routine loops embedded within:
Step 1. By using equation 3.1, estimate DEA output oriented efficiency scores µˆi
for all the countries in the sample data.
Step 2. By employing truncated maximum likelihood, equation 3.2 is estimated
and βˆ and σˆ estimates are obtained.
Step 3. The following four steps are repeated L1 times, for each i = 1, ..., n, to
yield a set of bootstrap estimates Bi = {µˆ∗ib}L1b=1.
• For each i = 1, ..., n, i is drawn from the N(0, σˆ).
• For each i = 1, ..., n, compute µ∗i = ziβˆ + i.
• Construct a pseudo data set (x∗i , y∗i ) where x∗i = xi and y∗i = yi
(
µˆi
µ∗i
)
• For all i = 1, ..., n, using the pseudo data set and equation 3.1, compute
pseudo efficiency estimates µˆ∗i .
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Step 4. Compute the bias-corrected estimator ˆˆµi as ˆˆµi = µˆi − Bias(µˆi) for each
i = 1, ..., n, where the bias term is
(
1
L1
∑L1
b=1 µˆ
∗
ib
)
− µˆi4.
Step 5. Regress ˆˆµi on zi to yield
ˆˆ
β and ˆˆσ employing truncated maximum likeli-
hood.
Step 6. Repeat the following three steps L2 times yielding a set of bootstrap
estimates Γ =
{
(
ˆˆ
β∗, ˆˆσ∗ )b
}L2
b=1
• For each country i = 1, ..., n, i is drawn from the N(0, ˆˆσ) distribution.
• For each country i = 1, ..., n, compute µ∗∗i = zi ˆˆβ + i.
• Regress µ∗∗i on zi to yield estimates ˆˆβ∗ and ˆˆσ∗ by employing truncated max-
imum likelihood.
Step 7. Construct the percentile bootstrap confidence intervals for each element
of β and σ using the bootstrap estimates Γ and the estimates
ˆˆ
β and ˆˆσ generated
in Step 5. The (1 − α) percent confidence interval of the jth element of vector β
is constructed as the Pr(−bα
2
6 ˆˆβ∗j − ˆˆβj 6 −aα2 ) ≈ 1− α such that the estimated
confidence interval is
[
ˆˆ
βj + a
∗
α
2
,
ˆˆ
βj + b
∗
α
2
]
.
4See [201]
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3.3 Data Illustration
The full data consists of 82 countries covering all income levels. Various sources
are used to obtain the basic data covering 1990-2014. Moreover, the sample pe-
riod is split into 5 non-overlapping periods. Data is collected using the relevant
existing literature that informs about the choice of inputs, outputs and a range
of economic, institutional, demographic and geographic variables. Besides, this
selection is essentially determined by the data availability.
A common concern in such studies is the direction of causation. Mostly in pro-
ductivity models there is an underlying assumption of straightforward causality
from inputs to outputs. However, it is equally possible that there is a simultaneous
feedback from outputs to inputs, for instance, in the public sector. There might ex-
ists positive correlation between the prosperity of state and its investments, as rich
countries are able to invest more. In case of failure to model endogeneity correctly,
when using econometric methods, there can be two policy implications. First, the
model employed to estimate the production function can be miss-specified. This
results in faulty inferences made about the importance of input variables as de-
terminants of those output possibilities which are of a particular interest. Second,
incorrect specification of the production function can lead to assessment errors of
the managerial efficiency of individual organizations. It is normally assumed that
in DEA methodology no material problems are caused by endogeneity[203]. Orme
and Smith (1996)[204] introduced the concept of sparsity bias in DEA scores. They
found that endogeneity in DEA is problematic, when the number of observations
is small and with the increase in sample size its importance reduces. Thus, the
problem of causality does not play a role in the current work because of the use of
DEA technique with the large number of observations. Moreover, as the current
work analyzes the nation’s progress at any given point of time or instant and makes
no statements about its long run impact or influence on future performance, the
problem of direction of causality does not play role.
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Stage I: Macroeconomic input and output variables
Every single component of an economy can be classified and aggregated into three
categories: land, labor and capital (including physical and human capital)[146].
The efficient use of these resources can make a country successful. The macroeco-
nomic input variables used in the stage one are human capital and capital stock,
and data is taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT) 9. In PWT the index
of human capital per person is calculated by using average years of schooling in
the population (Barro and Lee, 2013[34], Cohen and Leker (2014)[62]) and rate
of returns to education based on Mincer equation estimates around the world
(Psacharopoulos, 1994[177]). Capital stock at constant national prices (in mil-
lions 2011 US Dollar) is constructed as a To¨rnqvist aggregate of the individual
asset growth rates.
Alternative measures of nation’s progress and well-being are required as purchas-
ing power based measures do not fully describe the welfare, and the higher GDP
per capita values do not mean high performance. Considering only the monetary
yardstick can narrow the overall scope of well-being. Neumayer (2003) [163] ar-
gued that utility and well-being for people are not merely derived by income alone.
Inglehart et al. (2008)[113] described the economic progress as a part of happiness.
Several corresponding measures of well-being can be considered such as human de-
velopment index, standard of living index, happiness index, life expectancy index,
dependency ratio, etc. Adult stature, considered to be an excellent indicator in
this regard, is also used by many authors5.
In this work the multidimensional approach to measure national well-being is em-
ployed. Both economic and non-economic aspects are considered simultaneously as
macroeconomic output variables to assess the country’s progress and performance.
5See: Komlos (1985, 1987)[129, 130], Komlos and Baten (2004)[131], Steckel (2009)[207] and
Blum(2012)[49].
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GDP per capita and employment per person are used to measure economic activi-
ties. From PWT 9, the output-side real GDP at chained PPPs to compare relative
productivity capacity across countries (in millions US Dollars) (RGDPO) divided
by population (in millions) is used. Employment (in millions) gives the number
of persons engaged. Human well-being is measured by taking the average of the
percentage of population that have an access to clean water and improved sanita-
tion facilities divided by 100, and the data is obtained from World Development
Indicators (WDI) . Access to an improved water source refers to the number of the
population using clean drinking water source. An access to improved sanitation
facilities refers to the number of the population using improved sanitation facili-
ties6. Furthermore, environmental well-being is measured by the carbon dioxide
emissions data (metric tons per capita) and is obtained also from WDI. Carbon
dioxide emissions during the fossil fuels burning (consumption of solid, liquid, gas
fuels and gas flaring) and during the cement manufacture. 7.
Stage II: Determinants of Nation’s Progress
Economic determinants
Sovereignty is one of the basic and necessary requirement of a nation. It includes
protection from both internal and external threats. Defence spending is the
share of the national income kept by the states considering the welfare of their
countries. Impact of military spending on nation’s performance nowadays is one
of the most discussed areas. Arguments related to the impact of military spending
on economic growth vary a lot as either it enhances growth or lead to private
investment crowding out. Classical school of thought considers military spending
as the retarding factor for nation’s progress as it reduces domestic savings and
private investments due to higher interest rates leading to crowding out, which
6Source: WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply and Sanita-
tion.
7Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Environmental Sciences Division, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee, United States.
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means lowering aggregate demand by lowering consumption. However, Keyne-
sian school of thought contends that increased military expenditure stimulates
demand, increases purchasing power and national output and thus generates pos-
itive externalities[161]. Endogenous growth theory suggests that the impact of
state expenditures on long-run economic growth depends upon the size of the
government intervention and type of the public spending. Foundation of the re-
lationship between military expenditure and economic growth in the long-run is
provided by endogenous growth theory as an inverse hump shaped link[172].
Military expenditure is a special kind of the public spending exerting either neu-
tral or positive impact on some of the industries such as increased investment for
the production of defence tools and equipment, more expenditure on research and
development activities and employing more military staff. However, in the absence
of real threat large military force creates inefficient bureaucracies and it can also
exert negative impact by putting extra burden on fiscal resources and increasing
the warfare imports for developing countries. Aizenmann and Glick (2006)[14] dis-
cussed the positive and beneficial role of military spending for the countries facing
serious threats as it ensures their safety. Dunne and Tian (2015)[73] found the
negative effect of military burden on economic growth both in short and long-run
by using exogenous growth model and dynamic panel data method for 106 coun-
tries over the period 1988-2010. Korkmaz (2015)[132] stated the negative impact
of military expenditure on economic growth in a study employing panel data anal-
ysis for 10 Mediterranean countries from 2005-2010. Yildirim et al. (2016)[216]
employed the non-linear panel data to analyze the effect of military spending on
economic growth for Middle Eastern countries and Turkey for the period 1988-
2012. They highlighted the nonlinear effect along-with asymmetric relationship
and suggested that it is state of the economy that actually determines the impact
of military expenditure on growth. Military spending data is taken from WDI8.
8 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) , Yearbook: Armaments, Dis-
armament and International Security. It is based on the NATO definition, which includes all
current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense min-
istries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these
are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities.
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Trade openness is another potential determinant of nation’s progress. Through
the enhancement of trade, comparative advantage rules and income maximization
are gained. In order to grow fast an autarkic, closed or Soviet style models were
adapted by many developing countries after their independence but often failed.
After opening up to external trade these economies showed faster growth, lead-
ing to the stylized fact that ”trade causes growth”. Openness helps to exploit
comparative advantage, transfer of technology, knowledge diffusion, increase in
economies of scale and competitiveness[25]. Endogenous growth models highlight
that the trade policies effecting the resource allocation increase the worldwide
growth rate but simultaneously can adversely affect the country’s growth. How-
ever, neoclassical school advocates that, due to trade, comparative advantages
and efficiency gains increase the growth momentum. Moreover, by resource real-
location according to comparative advantages, a country can get static as well as
dynamic advantages. Post Keynesian and Schumpeter evolutionary models present
a structure allowing trade openness to effect long-term growth. There are large
number of empirical studies confirming the positive relationship between trade
and growth such as Sachs and Warner (1995)[191], Krueger and Berg (2003)[43],
Babula and Andereson (2008)[20], Bruckner and Lederman (2012)[51]. However,
there are many scholars criticizing the robustness of these results on measurement
and methodological grounds[208]. Trade openness is measured by adding exports
and imports of a year and dividing it by corresponding year GDP for each coun-
try. Data is obtained from WDI (Source: World Bank national accounts data, and
OECD National Accounts data files).
Gross domestic savings (GDS) is long being considered as an engine of eco-
nomic growth. Capital is generated by savings leading to technical innovations and
progress helping further to reap production economies of scale and specialization.
This in turn accelerates the labor productivity which creates positive impact on
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GDP. However, by view of standard growth theory the relationship between sav-
ing and growth appears to be puzzling[10]. Keynes ”paradox of thrift” highlighted
the somewhat constrained effect of savings on growth. Aghion et al. (2016)[10]
predicted in their model that domestic saving is more important in developing
countries to adopt new technologies. In their calibrated and simulated model they
found that the quantitative effect of domestic saving on growth is important. Lu-
gauer and Mark (2013)[145] argued that high saving rate of China is the engine of
its economic growth. Thornton (2009)[210] showed that higher savings does not
mean low consumption, rather it increases capital investment leading to higher
economic growth, although the possibility of slowing effect of saving on growth
in short-run cannot be excluded. Moreover, this negative effect in the short-run
is offset by positive impact of other factors. Domestic savings data is obtained
from WDI and is calculated as GDP less final consumption expenditure (total
consumption) (Source:World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National
Accounts data files).
Barro (2013)[33] believed that inflation influences economic growth negatively
and, although, in the short-run the adverse impact of inflation on growth is small,
in the long-run there are substantial effects on the standard of living. Higher infla-
tion can lead to uncertainty about the profitability of investment projects which
causes low investments and, moreover, interferes with country’s performance and
efficiency. Furthermore, it can effect international competitiveness of a country
by making exports expensive. There is a consensus on the inflation -growth rela-
tionship in economic theories. Classical economists in there supply side theories
emphasize the need to save and invest more in order to grow. Keynesian school
provided with the AD-AS framework linked inflation and growth more compre-
hensively. Monetarists stressed the critical role of monetary growth to determine
inflation. Moreover, Neoclassical and Endogenous growth theories highlighted the
impact of inflation on capital accumulation and investment leading to growth. The
data on inflation is obtained from WDI, where it is measured as consumer price
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index (annual percentage) (Source:International Monetary Fund, International Fi-
nancial Statistics and data files).
Terms of Trade (TOT) measures relative competitiveness of countries and is
defined as the ratio of export prices of commodities to import ones. Data is ob-
tained from world development indicators (WDI)9. Mostly economic theories tend
to believe in the positive relationship between TOT and economic growth. They
suggest three channels through which TOT impact economic growth. Firstly, by
effecting the capital productivity, which in turn changes the investment size, lead-
ing to dynamic impact on economic growth. Secondly, the size of total savings and
consumption are altered by TOT changes affecting growth. Thirdly, changes in
TOT bring fiscal changes (government revenue and spending) leading to changes
in economic growth[157].
Institutional determinants: Institutions play important role in determining
nation’s progress. Acemoglu et al. (2002, 2005)[2, 3]; Rodrik et al. (2004)[186];
Hall and Jones (1999)[101] empirically examined such factors and their impact on
economic progress. Easterly (2001)[76] stressed the importance of trustworthy in-
stitutional environment, without which the traditional factors will have no impact
on economic performance.
Lipset (1959)[143] studied the impact of political environment on economic growth
and performance. In general, the variables used in the political environment by
many researchers are durability of political regime (political stability) and degree
of democracy. Durable regime is the indicator of political stability based on the
number of years since last regime transition. Political stability reduces the un-
certainty, leading to more investments, and enhanced economic growth. Degree
of democracy is also an important determinant of nation’s progress. However,
9Net barter terms of trade index is calculated as the percentage ratio of the export unit value
indexes to the import unit value indexes, measured relative to the base year 2000.
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the relationship is much more complex as it can either retard or encourage eco-
nomic growth in many ways depending upon the channel it takes(Arvanitidis et
al. (2009)[25]; Alesina et al. (1996)[17]; Barro (1996)[32]). Democracies are often
linked with rule of law, secured property rights, economic freedom and human
capital which foster economic growth. Democracy tends to secure the property
rights, on the other hand, it makes the government vulnerable against the politi-
cal backlash in case of reforms which are costly in the short run but reap benefits
and growth in the long run. Although in democracy there is the possibility to re-
place inefficient governments, at the same time, influential and more consumption
oriented social section of the society demands a greater share of resources. The
political leaders in order to stay in power redistribute the income to the various
interest groups. This results in higher taxation and lower investments. Polity IV
data set is used for the above mentioned two variables, where, the regime durabil-
ity is measured by the number of years since the most recent regime change and
degree of democracy ranges from -10 (high autocracy) to +10 (high democracy)
(polity 2 index).
Political competition is measured as the degree of institutionalization or regula-
tion of political competition and the extent of government restrictions on political
competition. Polity IV data set is used. Political competition is an important
determinant of nation’s progress leading to better performing country. Marsh-
field (2011)[147] found it as the crucial aspect of state development because it
provides incentive for the leaders to represent popular will, increases the ability
for citizens to challenge the ruling government, and reduces the costs associated
with a representative government. But in the developing democracies constructive
political competition is difficult to achieve due to social, political and economic
exigencies. Such needs and demands create strong incentives for the leadership
to quash the opposition. Padovano and Ricciuti (2008) found correlation between
the political competition and the short term redistributive policy choices to buy
the vote, which in turn suppresses the economic performance[168]. Besley et al.
(2010)[45] suggested that lack of political competition may lead to the policies
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that “hinder” economic growth. They found, while testing their model on the US
states panel data, the robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state
is associated with anti-growth policies; lower capital spending, higher taxes and
reduced possibility of using right-to-work laws. They also highlighted the strong
linkage between low income growth and low political competition. Pavletic (2010),
during panel data analysis of 26 transition economies from 1991-2006, confirmed
the driving role of political competition in shaping the direction and success of
economic reforms in transition countries[171].
Political Rights and Civil Liberties data is taken from Freedom House Organi-
zation and are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest
degree of Freedom and seven the lowest. Political rights give an opportunity to
the people to participate in government activities and contribute in the law mak-
ing process. These rights presume the government structure allowing the citizens
to participate in public affairs either directly or through chosen representatives.
Civil liberties include the basic human rights, such as right to live, freedom from
torture, fair trial, freedom of thought and religion, freedom of expression, freedom
from discrimination, right to liberty, security and privacy. Both variables reduce
uncertainty and lead to greater efficiency and better progress.
Social infrastructure constitutes of government policies and institutions creat-
ing the economic environment, making individuals to learn productive skills and
motivate firms to build-up capital and produce output. It helps to produce favor-
able and supportive environment leading to skill learning, capital accumulation,
invention and technology spill-over. Hall and Jones (1999)[101] defined social in-
frastructure as the average of an index of government anti-diversion policies and
Sachs-Warner index of openness, where the index of government anti diversion
policies combines five institutional measures: law and order, bureaucratic quality,
corruption, risk of expropriation and government repudiation of contracts10. In the
10Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
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current research work the world wide governance indicators (WGI) consisting of
six institutional dimensions of governance, such as voice and accountability, polit-
ical stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality,
rule of law and control of corruption are used. The openness index provided by
Romain Wacziarg and Karen Horn Welch (2008)[212] is used.
Demographic and geographic determinants: In recent years the impact of
demography on nation’s progress has attracted a lot of scientific attention but still
many demographic aspects are left unexplored. Among the examined variables,
population density, population composition and urbanization tend to play impor-
tant role in economic growth and progress. Arvanitidis (2009)[25] suggested the
positive linkage between Population density and economic growth, because of
the enhanced specialization, diffusion of knowledge and so on. The population
density is expected to improve the nation’s performance by reaping benefits of
economies of scale and reducing the costs of service provision. Population compo-
sition or age distribution of the population also tends to affect country’s perfor-
mance and growth. The younger population (less than 14 years) is considered
as the future supply of working force. However, during the transition phase it
can exert negative impact on the growth by increasing the dependency burden on
the existing workforce, although in long-run the impact can be positive due to
the inclusion of fresh and energetic youth into the labor force. According to many
economists, the aging population (greater than 65 years) also impact the growth
negatively through increased ratio of dependents to workers and declining effect
on economic productivity. However, some researchers argue that population aging
would not negatively impact the productivity, rather effect growth positively due
to highly experienced workers over the period of time[176]. Urbanization and
growth relationship is becoming the important policy concern over the period of
time. The big cities are considered to be the engine of economic growth by enhanc-
ing the access to infrastructure and social services, better education and health
facilities. Big cities create hub for the better international investments, businesses
and also attract tourism. Metropolitan cities also provide better non-agricultural
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job opportunities, for instance, industrial and banking jobs. Diversity, interaction
and cross-cultural collaborations are also reap-able due to urbanization. Although
urbanization effect the progress of the country positively, however, its potential
to impact growth and progress depends upon the level of infrastructure and con-
ducive institutions[211].
Recent studies showed a positive impact of Internet on growth and progress
by generating increased and easy access to new ideas, technical and professional
knowledge and information enhancing productivity and reduce search costs. How-
ever, Moore et al. (2009)[159] pointed out that the internet use impacts growth
less positively due to rapid spread in the online crimes. Endogenous growth models
focused on the importance of increasing returns, R& D activities, human capital,
the generation and spread of new ideas and diffusion of technologies in general
for economic growth. Considering this, the new communication technologies such
as internet not only reduces the marginal costs of production but also facilitates
the generation and spread of new ideas and technological knowledge and enhances
research and development[153].This implies an increase in research process, pro-
ductivity and diffusion of its results and outcomes. Internet usage also impacts the
product and labor markets by increasing access to more information and reducing
search costs.
The data for the above discussed demographic variables is taken from World De-
velopment Indicators (WDI). Population density is measured by using midyear
population divided by land area in square kilometers. Population composition
consisting of population aging between the ages 0 to 14 and population ages 65
and above are taken as percentage of the total population. Population here is
based on the de facto definition of population which counts all residents regard-
less of legal status or citizenship. Urbanization is calculated by dividing urban
population to the total population during a year. Internet users are defined as
the individuals who used Internet (from any location) in the last 12 months and
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accessed the internet by using all or any type of devices such as computer, mobile
phone, personal digital assistant, games machine, digital TV, etc.,.
The social-cultural factors such as ethnic composition and fragmentation, lan-
guage, religion, beliefs, attitudes and socio/ethnic conflicts are being examined in
the literature to figure out their impact on national growth and progress. The big
part of the theory argues the negative impact of cultural diversity and linguistic
fractionalization on social cohesion, quality of governance, economic performance
and human development, concluding that diversity has negative influence on na-
tional performance. Cultural diversity is regarded as the major handicap within
the country’s borders[110]. Ethnic diversity and linguistic fractionalization are
considered to be the factors responsible for poor economic performance (Easterly
and Levine (1997)[74]) and also leading to the societal instability (Nettle et al.
(2007)[162]). However, as argued by Arvanitidis et al. (2009)[25] that although
cultural diversity may impact the economic growth and performance negatively
by creating social uncertainty and unrest, it can create cooperative flourishing
pluralistic environment positively effecting the nation’s progress in more liberal,
tolerant and open societies. While ethnic and linguistic fractionalization impact
the performance of a country negatively, religious fragmentation tends to im-
pact growth and performance positively as it occurs more often in tolerant and
free societies[15]. Fractionalization dataset, compiled by Alberto Alesina and as-
sociates, measuring the degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity in
various countries, is used.
The role of geography on economic growth is long recognized. Researchers
such as Hall and Jones (1999)[101]; Easterly and Levine (2003)[77]; Rodrik et al.
(2004)[186] used number of variables as a proxy for geography, for instance, lati-
tude, weather, average temperature and rainfall, proportion of land close to coast,
soil quality and disease ecology. Empirical studies affirm the direct impact of the
geographic variables, such as natural resources, topography, geographical isolation
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from global markets, climate and landlocked, on growth and country’s perfor-
mance (See: Armstrong and Read (2004)[24]; Masters and MsMillan (2001)[149];
Bloom and Sachs (1998)[48]; Sachs and Warner (1997)[190]). However, many oth-
ers, such as Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al (2004) after controlling
for institutions, found no impact of geography on growth[25]. In the present work
following the Hall and Jones (1999) distance from the equator, measured as the
absolute value of latitude in degrees divided by 90 to place it on 0 to 1 scale, is
used as a proxy for climate. Moreover, following the literature it is expected that
the countries, which are closer to equator exhibit low performance.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the calculated summary of descriptive statistics of the
variables used in the first and second stage of analysis, respectively.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of the Variables used in First Stage
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Ist quartile Median 3rd quartile Max.
GDP per capita 16259.51 15671.11 479.16 3840.7 10188.4 27042.6 92207.45
(USD)
Persons emp. 27.42 93.19 0.17 2.36 5.01 16.55 798.37
(in Millions)
Carbon dioxide 5.35 5.99 0.02 0.90 3.30 8.15 36.93
(Metric tons per
capita)
Average of improved 0.80 0.22 0.21 0.64 0.90 0.99 1.00
water and sanitation
facilities(% of pop.
with access)
Capital stock 2561167 6190193 6654 103271 578198 1768944 67590072
(USD)
Human capital 2.43 0.67 1.10 1.94 2.42 2.95 3.73
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of the Variables used in Second Stage
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Ist quartile Median 3rd quartile Max.
Military spending 2.36 3.39 0.00 1.23 1.82 2.72 117.39
Openness 0.78 0.53 0.14 0.47 0.64 0.95 4.40
GDS 19.90 14.10 -70.46 13.62 20.43 26.70 61.29
Inflation 18.49 198.93 -9.62 2.21 4.37 8.86 7481.66
TOT 0.02 0.94 -40.47 0.02 0.03 0.05 3.57
Democracy 5.03 6.18 -10.0 2.0 8.0 10.0 10.0
Durable regime 32.93 36.28 0.0 8.0 21.0 46.0 205.0
Political competition 7.41 3.09 -7.0 6.0 9.0 10.0 10.0
Political rights 2.87 1.96 1.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 7.0
Civil liberties 3.03 1.66 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 7.0
Social infrastructure 0.42 0.92 -2.07 -0.30 0.17 1.26 2.15
Climate 0.32 0.19 0.00 0.17 0.32 0.46 0.75
Ethnic fractionalization 0.40 0.25 0.00 0.15 0.41 0.63 0.93
Linguistic fractionalization 0.35 0.28 0.00 0.09 0.30 0.60 0.92
Religious fractionalization 0.41 0.25 0.00 0.20 0.38 0.64 0.86
Population density 214.84 691.39 1.40 30.08 80.85 191.67 7736.53
Urbanization 0.59 0.24 0.05 0.43 0.63 0.78 1.00
Pop ≤ 14 29.60 10.49 12.94 19.22 29.14 38.51 49.77
Pop ≥ 65 8.15 5.37 1.47 3.56 5.63 13.16 25.70
Internet Users 19.99 27.00 0.00 0.19 5.06 33.99 96.30
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3.4 Results and Discussion
First step DEA Results
The output oriented (VRS) DEA model is used considering four outputs and two
inputs. The input set considered contains capital stock and human capital.The
set of output variables includes the GDP per capita, persons employed, carbon
dioxide emission and availability of improved water and sanitation facilities to the
population. For the estimated performance scores, the value of 1 means nation’s
progress and bad performance is indicated by the values higher than one.
Fig 3.1 provides the overview of calculated region-wise averaged performance scores
for considered 82 countries from 1990 to 2014. In general, the average efficiency
scores for European and Oceania countries tend to show the high national per-
formance. The African countries show poor nation’s progress in relation to other
regions, however, the curve also presents steady but slow improvement in perfor-
mance for the considered time period. South American countries average scores
are declining moderately from 1.35 to 1.15 showing improvement in the regional
performance. For Asian and North & Central American11 countries the perfor-
mance tends to improve steadily but slowly between 1.1 and 1.2 band.
Fig 3.2 shows the Nation’s progress of a few selected Asian countries from 1990-
2014. China shows steady and improved performance slightly above one, however,
in the year 2014 there is a decline in progress due to deceleration in the economic
growth. Indonesia’s performance improved moderately between 1990-2004. How-
ever, the economy was hit hard due to the natural disaster (Tsunami) in Decemebr
2004 causing high death toll, huge infrastructural damage and lack of funds along-
with the delayed arrival of international aid. The Indonesian economy started to
11Including the Caribbean and Central American Countries.
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Figure 3.1: Region-wise Nation’s Progress Averages from 1990 to 2014
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recover from this natural catastrophe but still the relative performance is not good.
Indian performance is mixed and above one presenting various episodes of growth.
The graph shows a hump from 1996 to 2002 marking sect-oral growth slowdown
and almost stagnant growth from 2003 and on-wards. The graph for Mongolia
shows poor national performance, however, slow but steady improvements to-
wards better progress during the considered time period. Mongolian economy was
driven to recession after the collapse of Soviet Union (1991) which was worsened
by the series of natural disasters during 1996. However, the situation of export
based Mongolian economy improved due to international funding and increased
mining after 1999. The nation’s progress graph of Nepal shows bumps and peeks
at various points. Nepal is a landlocked and among one of the least developed
countries of the world. The economy started to progress with the restoration of
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democracy from autocratic rule in 1991. However, from 1996 the Maoists armed
struggle damaged the societal fabric for more than a decade . By the year 2006
the democracy won over the tri-partite power struggle, the King, the main stream
political parties and the Maoists, leading to liberal economic stance[166]. The
performance graph of Pakistan is relatively smooth but above one showing low
national progress.
Figure 3.2: Nation Progress in Asian Countries from 1990 to 2014 (selection)
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Fig 3.3 shows the performance scores for the selected African countries. The
performance scores for Kenya show increase in poor progress over the considered
period of time. Kenya’s economic performance slowed down after 1997 due to po-
litical instability, corruption and high population growth. The performance graph
of Mali is non smooth with relatively poorer performance in 2000. Mali’s economy
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over the last decade is generally viewed as performing well, however, the rate of
economic growth is slow due to over dependence on a few key sectors, persistent
structural weakness, lack of economic opportunities and increased unemployment.
Mozambique performance is relatively smooth and closer to 1 after 1996, because
of political stability and donor assistance. The performance curve for Mauritania
show poor progress during the first decade, which started to improve and accelerate
after 2000, because of the rescheduling or cancellation of the foreign debts. Swazi-
land performance scores are improving steeply from 1990 to 2005, largely because
of the liberal policies concerning foreign and private investments in areas, such
as mining and industry. But due to the deteriorating investment climate, erosion
of trade preferences, lack of competition, poor institutions and HIV/aids affected
bad workforce lead to decline in growth. The performance curve for Uganda shows
negative trend after 2002 caused by increased debt burden to finance government
spending, poor bureaucracy, high corruption and strict business policies leading
to reduced private investments.
The national progress of the South American countries is shown in figure 3.4.
Overall the trend among the South American countries is towards better perfor-
mance. Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are showing progress, almost approaching
one, during the considered period of time. Bolivia can be considered as the one
of bad performing country relative to other South American countries, however,
it is still positive progress at moderate rate. The Brazil performance curve shows
a small hump during 2000 due to political confidence crises during the general
elections; afterwards the progress tends to be improving. The Colombian progress
tends to be steady-going over the considered period of time. For Ecuador and
Peru the progress pattern is moderate and positively moving towards the better
performance scores. The performance scores of Paraguay show sharp increase in
performance due to its sound and predictable macroeconomic policies, solid finan-
cial system and poverty reduction.
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Figure 3.3: Nation Progress in African Countries from 1990 to 2014 (selection)
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Fig 3.5 gives the progress pattern of a few North and Central American countries.
Canada performance scores are close to one showing real good national progress
and growth considering all dimensions of welfare which are economic, environmen-
tal and human well-being. USA performance scores are also near one except a few
downturns such as during 2007, because of the Great Recession officially lasted
from December 2007 to June 2009. The progress graph for Guatemala shows al-
most stagnant progress during the first decade from 1990-2000 followed by the
better performance during 2000-2005. However, due to decline in growth rate and
increased regional poverty the performance declined. The performance of Jamaica
tends to be steady and almost stagnant over the considered period of time. The
performance curve of Mexico shows sharp improvements in progress due to un-
precedented stable macro economy leading to reduction in inflation and interest
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Figure 3.4: Nation Progress in South American Countries from 1990 to 2014
(selection)
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rates and increased per capita income. El Salvador progress is slow but steadily
improving over the considered time period showing recovery trends after the end
of civil war in 1992.
Figure 3.6 presents the national performance of the selected European countries.
Bulgarian economy showed better performance during 1992-1995, which after 1995
turned bad and from 2000 become almost stagnant. Bulgaria is situated in the
Eastern Balkans and is going through the transition phase to become market
economy after the end of the Communist rule. The graphs for both Greece and
Portugal show the moderate and consistent improvement in national performance
and approaching 1. The nation’s progress curve for Hungary also shows positive
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Figure 3.5: Nation Progress in North & Central American Countries from
1990 to 2014 (selection)
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improvements, although at relatively slow pace (relatively flat). The graph for
Luxembourg shows high peek of bad performance during 1998-2003 attributed to
the financial sector weaknesses, which in turn effected the economic growth and
public finances. Norway graph shows relatively consistent and better performance.
However, after 2010 the performance tend to decline due to the weak global eco-
nomic situation effecting the demand side components such as public purchases of
goods and services, business sector investments and exports, which creates damp-
ening impact on the Norwegian economic growth. The Poland performance curve
tends to show relatively steep progress (although above 1) after 2000 following the
policy of economic liberalization during 1990’s.
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Figure 3.6: Nation Progress in European Countries from 1990 to 2014 (selec-
tion)
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Second step- Determinants of Nation’s Progress
At this stage, the bias adjusted performance scores are related to potential determi-
nants. The results for VRS double bootstrap DEA specifications are presented in
Table 3.3, where eight alternative models are presented, depending on the consid-
ered environmental variables. The 100 bootstrap replications are used to compute
bias corrected efficiency estimates ˆˆµi. The estimates of confidence intervals are
constructed by using 2000 replications[202].
Based on the output DEA formulation in section 3.2, ceteris paribus , a negative
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sign of the estimated regression parameter indicates lower inefficiency (positive in-
fluence on progress), while a positive sign on an explanatory variable shows higher
inefficiency (an obstacle to progress)12. In table 3.3 bias adjusted coefficients are
presented and the statistical significance of the examined coefficient is indicated
when the value of zero does not fall within the associated confidence interval.
Economic determinants
The increased military expenditures (ME) tend to effect the nation’s progress
positively. As defence expenditure is a special kind of spending being carried out
to preserve sovereignty of a country, it exerts positive influence on national perfor-
mance. In relevant literature the impact of defence spending on nation’s progress
is mixed. Aizenmann and Glick (2006)[14] argued, that the increased expenditure
on the military is beneficial to the economic growth for the countries in acute
threats, as this ensures safety. However, as shown by Gupta et al. (2001)[99], in-
creased military expenditure is a loss on the part of welfare and human well-being.
The large military forces lead to large military order volumes, inefficient bureau-
cracies and organizational set-ups, that lead to rent seeking and corruption[97].
Lee and Chen (2007)[137] applied long- run panel regression analysis on the data
for 27 OECD and 62 non-OECD countries from 1988 to 2003 and found the posi-
tive relationship between GDP and ME for OECD countries and negative impact
on the non-OECD countries. For low income countries Chang et al. (2011)[60]
applied GMM method to 90 countries panel data from 1992 to 2006 and found
negative impact of ME on economic growth. Wijeweera and Webb (2011)[213]
applied panel- co-integration from 1988-2007 for five South Asian countries13 and
found positive but negligible impact of ME on economic growth.
12See Simar and Wilson (2007)[202].
13Bangladesh,India, Nepal, Pakistan and Srilanka
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The impact of Tade openness was expected to be positive on the nation’s
progress. However, results show negative and significant impact of trade open-
ness on Nation’s progress. Bhalla (2012)[47] pointed out, that in order to improve
the significance of openness the currency valuation measures should be introduced.
The open economy along-with competitive currency tend to impact growth and
progress positively.
Gross domestic savings effect the nation’s progress positively. Savings help to
generate capital leading to technical innovations and progress helping further to
reap production economies of scale and specialization. This in turn accelerates the
labor productivity, thus creating positive impact on economic growth and nation’s
progress.
Institutional determinants
The degree of democracy impact nation’s progress negatively, with weak con-
firmation in model 8 at 1% level of significance. The result does not imply that
autocracy is better than democracy. Although the Democracy ranges from -10
(high autocracy) to +10 (high democracy), but about 75% of the data gives posi-
tive democracy values suggesting a relative disadvantage of the liberal democracy
over the restricted one. Barro (1996)[32] found the slightly negative effect of overall
democracy on growth in an analysis on a panel of 100 countries while controlling
the factors, such as initial level of GDP per capita, government consumption, free
markets, property rights and human capital. The democratic governments display
status-quo bias, submit more to interest groups and avoid costly reforms[16, 83].
Tavares and Wacziarg (2001)[209] stated that democracy fosters growth by improv-
ing human capital accumulation and, less robustly, by lowering income inequalities.
However, they also pointed out that democracy hinders growth by reducing the
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physical capital accumulation rate and by increasing the ratio of government con-
sumption to GDP.
Significant and positive coefficient of durable regime implies that political stabil-
ity and reliable political rule leads to consistent budgetary planning and enhances
nation’s performance by reducing uncertainty and encouraging investments.
The model 5 in Table 3.3 gives the positive and significant impact of the polit-
ical competition on nation’s progress. The political competition at elections
does effect the performance positively depending upon country’s overall factors
of development. However, the lack of political competition and political market
imperfections can lead to the low credibility of pre-electoral manifestos and voting
lists. The positive impact of political competition is channeled through many ways
to nation’s progress. It adds to the society’s pool of knowledge and suggests alter-
native policies to overcome agency and capacity problems of a country. Political
competition also influences the behavior of the political leaders, representatives
and politicians to act in the best interest of people in order to avoid the dismissal
and stay in the power. The citizens of a politically competitive society can express,
organize and assert their demands in an efficient and convincing way.
Political rights can be defined as the degree to which government is controlled
by the individual. The impact of political rights on the country’s performance
is positive suggesting that more the citizens have political freedom, the better
they can influence the political setup either themselves or by their representatives.
Moreover, because of more checks and balances political liberties help to take bet-
ter and more sensible decisions leading towards positive growth and progress.
Socail infrastructure effects the performance of a country positively. Social
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infrastructure not only directly influence the growth and progress, but also in-
directly effects the other determinants of economic growth, such as investment,
human and physical capital, technical improvements, innovations and skill acqui-
sitions. Social infrastructure builds favorable and constructive environment in a
country that supports productive activities, technological development and capital
accumulation.
Demographic and geographic determinants
The climate, proxy here by the distance from the equator, shows a positive im-
pact on the country’s performance. The countries closer to the equator are at
natural disadvantage because of the high temperature and bad soil leading to low
productivity and, thereby, lower growth. Moreover, the tropical climate is more
pron to diseases and epidemics and due to high temperatures less conducive to
work, thus slowing down the pace of growth. The result is in accordance with the
findings of La Porta et al. (1999) [136] that the countries which are farther from
the equator exhibit good performance.
Ethnic and linguistic fractionalization have negative and significant effect on
nation’s progress. The results confirm the theoretical and empirical survey that the
cultural diversity and ethno-linguistic factionalization negatively impact the social
cohesion and governance quality, economic performance and human development,
suggesting that diversity is not good for nation’s progress. Due to cultural diver-
sity and more spoken languages the problem of integration arise. Moreover, the
communication becomes more difficult and it gets expensive to deliver the public
services. The transaction costs to overcome many languages and ethnic prejudices
increase. Linguistic differences may also require increased redistribution policies
which are potentially less efficient[16, 74]. The results are in line with the find-
ings of La Porta et al. (1999)[136] that the national performance is reduced due
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to higher ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. However, religious fragmenta-
tion positively effect the national performance showing that in tolerant, secular
and free societies more religious sects live together and contribute positively in
growth and progress.
The demographic variables considered have positive and significant impact on
growth and progress of a nation except population aging under 14 having mostly
positive but insignificant effect. Hauner and Kyobe (2010)[104] evidenced the pos-
itive effect of higher population density on government efficiency by decreasing the
cost of service provision because of the economies of scale and by reducing trans-
portation and heating costs. Population density helps to increase the knowledge
diffusion, reap benefits of economies of scale and reduce overall costs. Urban pop-
ulation growth tends to increase the living standards and promote the growth.
Moreover, urbanization along-with conducive environment, supportive policies,
suitable infrastructure, and institutional setup can lead to better performing and
progressing country. Population above 65 also positively effect the progress of
a nation by rendering their experiences and skills to the working force of a coun-
try. Moreover, with better health facilities over the period of time the working
age has increased and reduced population dependency allowing more learned and
experienced workers to stay longer in the labor force.
The impact of the internet use is positive and significant for the nation’s progress.
The increased internet accessibility helps to ease the transfer of knowledge and
skills and enhances the access to the latest research and development (R& D) from
all over the world. Over the period of time, the R& D process and the spread of
resulting knowledge is changing tremendously because of the use of new commu-
nication technologies. Thus internet use induces not only temporary growth but
also permanent growth.
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3.5 Conclusions
The current study undertakes the examination of determinants of nation’s progress
with a cross country panel data of 82 countries from 1990 to 2014. The nation’s
progress is measured using three dimensions of well-being, that is economic, envi-
ronmental and human well-being. The economic well- being is measured by using
GDP per capita and the number of persons employed. Over the period of time
the role of healthy environment, use of energy resources and natural resources,
including better air quality (important for both nature and human), green house
gas emissions, energy consumption, renewable energy resources, renewable wa-
ter resources, forests and biodiversity, respectively, are considered to be of great
importance for measuring well-being of a country. Carbon dioxide emissions are
taken as a proxy for measuring environmental well-being of a country. Moreover,
human well-being is measured as the population having access to the clean water
and safe sanitation facilities, representing the basic needs of human welfare. This
study also offers methodological improvements compared to the existing relevant
literature as the biasd DEA efficiency scores, which provide unreliable standard
errors when used in the second stage as dependent variable, are replaced by the
bias adjusted efficiency estimates. For this purpose the methodology proposed by
Simar and Wilson (2007)[202] is used. Moreover, the present study is able to draw
more realistic picture of the considered countries progress as more practical input
and output variables including three dimensions of well-being are used to measure
the Nation’s progress, comparing to many other studies which rely only on GDP
for estimations.
This work tries to investigate and explore nation’s progress by considering eco-
nomic and non-economic aspects simultaneously. The results give insight into the
average behavior and performance of countries over the considered period of time.
The African countries in general experienced a decline in progress due to political
instabilities, poverty, natural disasters such as famine and droughts, influence of
war and larger dependency on foreign aid and donations. Overall, the progress
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of Asian, European, South American and North & Central American countries is
relatively mixed, however, showing moderate improvements during the considered
period of time.
The regression results show that among the economic determinants the impact of
military spending is positive, as increased spending not only help to secure the
sovereignty of a country, it also leads to increased investments in R& D. The role
of openness tends to be negative on nation’ progress, in the absence of competi-
tive currency valuation measures. Gross domestic saving role is also positive, as
it helps to reduce the foreign dependence of a country by generating and using
the domestic funds to create capital. Results also (weakly) present that restric-
tive democracy tends to be advantageous as compared to the liberal democracy.
The institutional environment of a country exert not only the direct influence on
the growth and progress but also effect the human and physical capital accumula-
tion, investments, technical changes and processes of economic growth. The stable
and trustworthy institutional setup ensures better progress and by increasing the
level of accountability of institutions and controlling corruption the higher welfare
levels can be achieved. Culturally diversified and ehtno-linguistic heterogeneous
societies are less efficient and are more pron to corruption. The effect of demo-
graphic and geographic factors is also positive. The internet use also effects the
progress positively, as it helps to accrue more knowledge and latest technical and
research skills without incurring the mobility costs.
The results presented in the current work suggest many further framework scenar-
ios, which can be used to increase the nation’s progress and enhance the welfare
and well-being of a country. After the financial system crises, partly caused by
the amplified stress on material growth at all costs, it is realized that actual and
balanced growth and development is being neglected. The requirement now is
to set new goals and establish new ways to estimate progress. The new goals
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should consider social, ecological welfare along-with sustainable economic well-
being. Moreover, proper measures and strategies should be adapted to achieve
those goals. Policy makers should focus on plans and strategies to better allo-
cate the resources and funds. Conducive environment and suitable institutional
set-up helps to strengthen performance of a nation. Furthermore, trustworthy in-
stitutional environment along-with suitable economic policies helps to reap more
benefits from demographic and geographic factors, which otherwise either need a
lot of time and effort to change (population composition) or cannot be altered
(geography). The impact of the linguistic fractionalization and ethnic differences
can be reduced by redistributing the funds to all sections of the population and
by providing all with the equal access to education and other social benefits.
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Chapter 4
Impact of Financial Development
and Remittances on Economic
Growth and Productivity Growth
A panel of 103 countries including developed and developing economies over the
period 1980-2014 is used to study the role of financial development, remittances
and their interaction terms on economic growth and total productivity. A panel
econometric framework is used and the findings of the study are following: 1. The
role of financial development and remittances is positive on economic growth and
their interaction terms support the substitution hypothesis, suggesting the relax-
ing role of remittances in case of weak financial markets in receiving countries. 2.
However, the role of financial development and remittances on productivity growth
is insignificant. 3. The state of development of the countries also influences the
corresponding roles of remittances, financial development and their interaction
terms on economic growth.
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4.1 Introduction
In an influential theoretical and empirical survey Levine (2005)[138] suggested the
role of financial development to improve economic growth in the long run. This
survey also pointed out the reluctance of many economists to acknowledge the im-
portance of finance in economic growth. The collection of essays by the pioneers of
development economics, featured no role of financial markets and institutions on
economic growth[152]. The whole idea of the finance-growth nexus was dismissed
by Lucas (1988)[144]. He considered the finance as an over-stressed economic
growth determinant. Robinson (1952)[182] believed that finance acts in response
of the real sector, rather than the view that finance induces economic growth.
Merton Miller (1998)[156] argued that the proposition regarding the contribution
of financial markets to economic growth is “too obvious for serious discussion”.
However, some other influential economists such as Bagehot (1873)[27], Schum-
peter (1934)[193], Gurley and Shaw (1955)[100], Goldsmith (1969)[92], McKinnon
(1973)[151], Shaw (1973)[194], Greenwood & Jovanovic (1990)[96] and Bencivenga
& Smith (1991)[41] acknowledged the important role of financial development
in raising productivity and promoting economic growth. These economists gave
the argument that the omission of finance from the economic growth explanation
makes the discussion incomplete.
In traditional growth theory, main driving forces for economic growth are consid-
ered to be factor accumulation. Goldsmith (1969)[92] showed the contribution of
financial development to growth of total factor productivity by raising marginal
productivity of capital. McKinnon (1973)[151] and Shaw (1973)[194] expressed
the role of financial development in improving the efficiency of capital allocation
thus increasing the aggregate saving rates and investment levels. However, the
impact of financial development in the traditional framework gets limited due to
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the capital stock diminishing returns to scale [142].
A new theoretical underpinning to the analysis of relationship between financial de-
velopment, productivity and economic growth, providing with important insights,
emerged with the endogenous growth literature pioneered by Romer (1986)[187].
The endogenous technological progress through research and development (R & D)
may result in non- diminishing capital returns thus effecting the aggregate pro-
ductivity positively. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990)[96] highlighted in their
endogenous model two important functions of financial institutions and interme-
diaries in enhancing growth. Firstly, collection and analysis of investment projects
and secondly, increase in the investment efficiency through allocation of the funds
to the highest expected return projects. Bencivenga and Smith (1991)[41] focused
in their endogenous model on the enhancement of liquidity and idiosyncratic risk
mitigation through risk diversification. They argued that the developed financial
intermediaries allocate funds efficiently and thus contribute to growth. The au-
thors like Levine (1991)[139] and Saint-Paul (1992)[192] showed the importance of
portfolio diversification and risk sharing via stock markets in inducing sustained
growth.
The positive relation between financial development and economic growth also re-
ceived considerable empirical support (for instance, see King and Levine (1993)[125],
Beck et al.(2000)[38] and Levine et al.(2000)[141]). King and Levine (1994)[126]
and Fry (1995)[86] argued that capital accumulation is the key factor for economic
growth. However, Benhabib and Spiegel (2000)[42] examined both the channels
through which the financial development affects the economic growth. Firstly, the
primitive channel where the financial development affects growth solely through its
contribution to factor accumulation as suggested in traditional growth theory and
secondly, the channel of productivity improvements as highlighted by endogenous
growth literature which is mainly attributed to knowledge creation and techno-
logical progress. They showed that financial development is positively correlated
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with growth in both total factor productivity and investment.
In summary, there exists an important relationship between the finance and growth
process as stressed by the widely agreed findings from the survey of the relevant
theories, evidences and policy works in this area[95]. Both theoretical and em-
pirical works give evidence that better functioning and efficient financial systems
can lead to faster capital accumulation and higher productivity growth, by risk
reduction and increased diversification, savings mobilization and best allocation
of resources, corporate control exertion and managers monitoring, facilitation of
exchange of goods and services and reduction of monitoring cost [140]. However,
with the beginning of the banking crises in 2007, there is huge critic on financial
deregulation arguing it either the cause or fuel for such crises. Critics also debated
that deregulation allowed financial institutions to become too large and to take
big risks that eventually made government to step in to avoid the failure and risk
of damaging the entire economy.
Although, it is acknowledged that the financial development do impact the pro-
ductivity and economic growth but still there exists gap regarding the mecha-
nism through which the financial sector reforms can influence economic growth
[66, 160]. The literature supporting the impact of financial development on pro-
ductivity and economic growth does not provide consensus on the transmission
mechanism. In the relevant current literature, a bi-directional causality between
finance and economic growth, in which both are determined endogenously, is pro-
posed. Advanced econometric techniques and instrumental approaches such as
instrumental variable estimator approach and Generalized Method of Moments
approach (GMM) are used in the empirical works due to the endogenous nature
of the variables. These approaches help to control the endogeneity arising either
due to the dynamic specification or due to reverse causation.
The current work investigates the relationship between financial development, eco-
nomic growth and productivity for 103 countries by using the panel econometric
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techniques1. Moreover, this work attempts to investigate the impact of remit-
tances on economic growth and productivity. The link between remittances and
financial development is also analyzed in aggregate for all the considered countries
and also by considering the development state of the countries2.
Remittances are the earnings of the workers working abroad and send to their
homelands. These are different from other sources of foreign exchange (Net ex-
ports, FDI and international aids, etc.). For many developing countries remit-
tances are a significant part of international capital flows, often exceeding the tra-
ditional sources such as export revenues, foreign aid and foreign direct investments
(FDI)(see Ratha (2005)[179], Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009)[91], Aggarwal et
al. (2011)[9], Rao and Hassan (2011)[178], Bettin and Zazzaro (2012)[46], Nya-
mongo et al.(2012)[165], Matuzeviciute and Butkus (2016) [150], Meyer and Shera
(2017) [155], Hassan and Shakur (2017) [102]). Figure 4.1 presents the percent-
age share of the remittances to GDP along-with the percentage share of the net
exports and FDI to GDP for 103 considered countries. During the first decade of
21st century remittances were the second biggest source of foreign exchange after
FDI in aggregate. However, for the last couple of years remittances tend to be at
par with FDI. Figure 4.2 presents the percentage share of FDI, net exports and
remittances to GDP according to the development state of the countries. For the
low and lower middle income countries the major contributor to foreign exchange
reserves is remittances. The relative importance of remittance for the high income
countries lies after FDI and Net Exports. Figure 4.3 shows the recipients of the
remittances among the selected countries sharing more than 10% to GDP in the
year 20103.
1List of selected countries given in Appendix C.1.
2Economies are categorized by using the World Bank income classification which assigns the
countries into four income groups: high (> 12235), upper middle (3956 − 12235), lower middle
(1006− 3955) and low (< 1005) on the basis of GNI per capita in current US $
3Source World Bank Development Indicators and Author’s calculations.
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Figure 4.1: Remittances, Net Exports and FDI, 1980-2014
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Remittances are private flows spent partly on consumption and partly on invest-
ment. The relevant literature on the role of remittances on growth and devel-
opment suggested both positive and negative impacts of it on economic growth.
Chami et al. (2005) [58], Amuedo- Dorantes and Pozo (2004) [19] found the
negative impact of remittances on growth in their studies. There is asymmetric
information as the r-emitter cannot control use of the remitted amount which may
be intended to use on investment projects. Moreover, as remittances are mostly
send to the households to fulfill consumption requirements, the recipients can pre-
fer leisure over work, rendering negative impact on labor productivity and growth.
Furthermore, remittances increase foreign exchange resources and flows which can
appreciate the exchange rate leading to the country’s competitiveness erosion in
international trade. However, due to the time stable flow of remittances , the con-
cerned ”Dutch Disease” effects of remittances may not be trusted (IMF (2005)).
The welfare and supportive role of remittances in eradication of poverty of the
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recipients (r-emitter relatives) is also highlighted in literature (see Chami, Ful-
lenkamp and Gapen (2009)[59], Gupta et al. (2007)[98], Adams (2004) [5] and
Richard, Adams H. Jr. Page, John (2003, 2005) [[181], [6]]). Increase in remit-
tances during the economic downturns help to smooth household consumption
[165]. Remittances tend to improve per capita income of the receiving countries
but on the other hand it may lead to income inequalities. Moreover, remittances,
as a source of savings and capital for investment, also effect the productivity and
employment which lead to economic growth and development ([21], [215]). Fur-
thermore, as remittances are also considered to be the part of export of goods
and services, higher remittances enhance the debt to exports ratio, which is one of
the indicators to assess credit worthiness of a country for international borrowing
[165]. Remittances have become more acceptable as a collateral for international
borrowing both in public and private sectors, due to their stable time profile [124].
Aggarwal et al. (2011) [9] highlighted the role of remittances in the growth of
financial sector in recipient countries. When remittances are channelized through
formal financial sector, on one hand it makes the receiver to open account in the
bank and on the other increase the lending capacity of the commercial banks to
the private sector.
According to the relevant literature there exists ambiguous relationship between
remittances, financial development and economic growth. For instance, the well
developed and functioning financial sector, through information and transaction
costs minimization, can help to utilize remittances into suitable and profitable
projects bearing high yield, leading to increased growth. On the other hand, in
case of bad or weak financial markets, remittances can help to resolve the liquidity
problems, credit constraints, collateral issues and high lending costs by providing
entrepreneur with the start-up capital and funds for productive activities. The
former attributes to the complementary behavior of the remittances and financial
development leading to growth, whereas, the latter presents the substitute role of
remittances for financial development in growth process.
110 Chapter 4 Impact of Financial Development and,. . .
The present work seeks to add to the existing literature in this field by making the
following contributions: (1) The impact of the financial development on economic
growth and productivity growth are studied. Non-parametric growth accounting
technique is used to estimate the productivity growth. (2) The effect of remit-
tances on economic growth and productivity is also highlighted along-with the
impact of remittance volatility. (3) The growth effect of remittances by using
financial sector development level on economic growth and productivity is also
studied. (4) Moreover, the analysis is further done by categorizing the countries
into high, upper middle, lower middle and low income groups which reveals that
development state of the countries does influence the estimates. Considering the
literature reviewed on this subject this area is not yet fully explored. (5) Large
set of cross country panel data containing 103 countries for the period of 35 years
(from 1980 to 2014) is covered in the current study.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 4.1 is the introduction. In section
4.2 the estimation methodology is described. The data description is given in the
section 4.3. The empirical analysis is done in the section 4.4. The last section 4.5
presents the conclusions.
4.2 Estimation Methodology
A panel data-set consisting of 103 developing and developed countries is used to
analyze the relationship among remittances, financial development and growth.
The equations considered for econometric estimations are as follow:
GGDPit = β0 + (β1 − 1)yi,t−1 + β2Xit + β3Wit + ηt + υi + εit (4.1)
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where GGDP is growth rate of real GDP per capita. y is real GDP per capita
and ((β1− 1) is the convergence coefficient. Xit is the set of explanatory variables
including financial development, remittances and the interaction terms. Wit is the
set of control variables including openness (sum of exports and imports to GDP),
foreign direct investment, inflation, and education. ηt and υi denote the time and
country specific effects. εit is the error term.
GTFPit = α0 + α1yi,t−1 + α2Xit + α3Wit + ηt + υi + εit (4.2)
where GTFP is the total factor productivity growth. Malmquist TFP index
method[57] is used to estimate total factor productivity, which measures the change
between two data points by calculating the ratio of the distances of each data point
relative to a common technology. The Malmquist (output-oriented) TFP change
index between base period t and current period t+ 1 is given by:
Mo(yt, xt, yt+1, xt+1) =
[
dto(yt+1, xt+1)
dto(yt, xt)
dt+1o (yt+1, xt+1)
dt+1o (yt, xt)
] 1
2
The value of Mo greater than one indicates positive TFP growth from period t to
period t+ 14.
Following the related empirical literature, three indicators of financial develop-
ment in a country are used:Domestic credit to private sector (PRVT) as a ratio
to GDP, claims on central government (CGOV) as a ratio to GDP and the ratio
of broad money supply to GDP (M2). PRVT is the most common measure of
financial inter-mediation and refers to the financial resources provided to the pri-
vate sector by financial corporations as a share of GDP. The financial corporations
include monetary authorities, deposit money banks, finance and leasing compa-
nies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension funds and foreign exchange
4Data Envelopment Analysis Program (DEAP) Software version 2.1 by Tim J. Coelli is used
(CRS and output orientation).
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companies. PRVT represents the actual resources channeled to the private sector.
The indicator CGOV refers to the claims on the central government including loan
to public institutions net of deposits divided by GDP. The PRVT and CGOV are
used to measure the financial depth. The M2 is a monetization variable and is also
most commonly used measure of financial development[54, 125]. A higher ratio
of M2 presents more financial inter-mediation and larger financial sector, showing
real size of the country’s financial sector. This ratio increases over time when the
growth of financial sector exceeds the growth of real sector[165]. The volatility of
M2 (DM2) is computed from the ratio of M2 to GDP as a proxy for the available
financial liquidity (the proxy for volatility is the standard deviation of this ratio
over a period of three years).
Remittances comprise of the personal transfers and compensations of employees
where former include all current transfers between residents and non-resident indi-
viduals. The latter attribute to the income of workers (border, seasonal and other
short-term workers) who are residents and employed in a non-resident entity and
of nonresidents employed by the resident economy5. The volatility in remittance is
calculated from the ratio of remittances to GDP and the proxy for it is the devia-
tion of remittances from its three year trend. The high volatility in remittances is
expected to have dampening effect on the growth of receiving country, as negative
shock in remittances reduce the availability of funds and capital for productive
activities and investments.
The interaction term is also incorporated (FD.Rem) to show the impact of re-
mittances on economic growth and productivity growth with the financial devel-
opment. There is an ongoing debate in related literature on whether financial
development and remittances are complements or substitutes. The supporters of
substitutability hypothesis argue that in emigration countries the lack of financial
5See sixth edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual: personal transfers and com-
pensation of employees.
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development is relaxed by remittances as this permits poor people to invest in prof-
itable investment projects even though there are difficulties in attaining credit6.
However, the complementary hypothesis suggests that financial development and
remittances support each other. It argues, that when there is a high degree of
financial development, the migrants can send more money home safely at faster
and cheaper rate . The larger amount of remittances may stimulate the interests
of financial institutions and government authorities by increasing the competition
among themselves. Moreover, the better institutional reforms may be taken in
order to channelize the remittances toward productive investments7.
The following four variables are included as control variables to capture the impact
of macroeconomic stability. Openness which is commercial openness divided by
GDP (exports plus imports divided by GDP). Foreign direct investment (FDI) is
the net inflows of investment (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the
economy from the foreign investors and is divided by GDP. Inflation (INF) shows
the future market degree of uncertainty and is measured as the annual change
in the consumer price index. Moreover, the variable education (EDU), showing
the average years of primary school of the country’s total population, is used as a
control for human capital accumulation.
4.3 Data Description
The real GDP data is obtained from PWT 9.0. Real GDP using national ac-
counts growth rates is used as it helps to compare (output-based) growth rates
across countries8. The data for all the three proxies of financial development is
obtained from the World Data Bank: World Development Indicators. The claims
6See Caldero´n et al.(2008)[53], Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009)[91].
7See Nyamongo et al.(2012)[165], Aggarwal et al. (2011)[9] and Mart´ınez et al.(2008)[148].
8‘rgdpna’ Real GDP at constant national prices (in mil. 2011 US dollar).
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on central government (CGOV) as a ratio to GDP, include loans to central gov-
ernment institutions net of deposits. Domestic credit to private sector (PRVT)
as a ratio to GDP refers the financial resources (such as loans, purchases of non-
equity securities, trade credits and other accounts receivable which are subject
to repayment) are given to the private sector by financial corporations (finance
and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension funds, and
foreign exchange companies). The money supply M2 is frequently defined as “the
money and quasi money comprise the sum of currency outside banks, demand
deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and
foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government”9.
Data on remittances as a ratio of GDP is also taken from the World Data Bank
source. Personal remittances are the sum of two items defined in the sixth edition
of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual: personal transfers and compensation
of employees.
The World Data Bank: world development indicators source is also used to obtain
data for the four control variables. Exports and Imports of goods and services rep-
resent the value of all goods and other market services provided to and received by
the rest of the world, respectively. FDI is the ratio of foreign direct investments
(net inflows) to GDP. Inflation measured by the consumer price index highlights
the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a
basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals,
such as yearly. Gross primary enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment,
regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to
the level of education shown.
9See World Data Bank: World development indicators.
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The data for the Malmquist productivity index including real GDP (Output)10,
physical capital11 and labor12 (inputs) is taken from the PWT 9.0.
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study.
Bi-variate Correlations between the variables considered are shown in table 4.2.
GDP growth is positively related with trade openness, years of education, FDI and
negatively related with inflation. The correlation between GDP growth and CGOV
is negative, whereas, the correlations between PRVT and M2 with GDP growth are
positive. The relation between remittances and GDP growth is also positive. The
correlations between proxies of financial development are positive (CGOV and M2)
with remittances. However, it is negative between PRVT and remittances. The
correlation of total factor productivity growth (GTFP) with PRVT is negative
but really small, moreover, with the other two proxies of financial development
the correlations are positive. Remittances and years of education are negatively
correlated with GTFP.
Figure 4.4 presents the five year averages (from 1980 to 2014) of the proxies for
financial development and remittances for 103 considered countries. The domestic
credit and M2 as percentage of GDP show growth in the financial sector of the
economies. Moreover, remittances are also improved from about 2.41% to 3.69%
on average. Figure 4.5 gives the five year averages of the considered countries on
the basis of their state of development. Countries are categorized by using the
World Bank income classification which assigns the economies into four income
groups: high (greater than 12235), upper middle (3956 - 12235), lower middle
(1006 - 3955) and low (less than 1005) on the basis of GNI per capita in current
US $. For high income countries the percent share of all the financial development
proxies tends to increase over considered period of time, whereas, remittances
percent share in GDP diminishes on average. The growth of the financial sector in
low income countries is relatively low however, the percentage share of remittances
in GDP has increased from 1% to 5.76% on average. For upper and lower middle
10‘rgdpo’ Output side real GDP at PPPs (in mil. 2011 US dollar).
11‘rkna’ Capital stock at constant national prices (in mil. 2011 US dollar).
12‘emp’ Number of persons engaged (in millions)
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income countries the percentage increase of remittances is steady at around 1%
on average for the whole considered time period, however, there is a decline in the
percentage share of CGOV in GDP for both states of development.
4.4 Estimation Results
In order to explore the impact of financial development and remittances on growth
and productivity a panel data-set comprising of 103 countries for the period of
1980-2014 is used. Panel econometric technique, ordinary least squares (OLS) is
used. Moreover, to address the issue of endogeneity, for instance, the plausible
impact of higher economic growth and productivity on remittances and finan-
cial development leading to overstatement of effects, instrumental variable esti-
mation techniques (IV-2SLS and IV-GMM) are employed. The Sargan- Hansen
test of over-identifying restrictions is performed, under the null hypothesis that
the instruments are valid, that is the instruments are uncorrelated with the er-
ror term and from the estimated equation the excluded instruments are correctly
excluded . Anderson Canonical Correlations LM statistic is used to test whether
the equation is identified and that the excluded instruments are relevant, meaning
correlated with the endogenous regressors. In robust case Kleibergen- Paap rk
under-identification test statistic is used. Moreover, when the excluded instru-
ments are correlated with the endogenous regressors (only weakly) the problem
of “Weak identification” arises, resulting into the poor performing estimators due
to weak instruments13. Cragg Donal Wald F statistic is used. Stock and Yogo
(2005) compiled the critical values for this statistic. In robust case ivreg2 reports
a correspondingly- robust Kleibergen- Paap Wald rk F statistic.
At first the impact of financial development on growth is estimated by using the
equation 4.1, where, Xit only consists of the proxies of financial development.
13See STATA help ivreg2
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Table 4.3 presents the relationship between financial development and GDP per
capita growth using OLS, IV-2SLS and IV-GMM. The estimated results are in
line with the previous literature in this field. The impact of financial development
proxies, that is claims on central government as a ratio to GDP, domestic credit
to private sector as ratio to GDP and money supply (M2) as a ratio to GDP, have
positive and significant impact on growth. The volatility of money supply has
negative and significant estimates, highlighting the dampening effect of volatile
financial liquidity on growth. The estimated coefficients of years of schooling and
foreign direct investments are positive and significant, whereas, the initial level of
GDP per capita and inflation have negative and significant impact on economic
growth.
The tables 4.4 and 4.5, present the range of results showing the impact of re-
mittances, financial development and interaction terms on economic growth by
employing OLS and Instrumental variable techniques, respectively, using data-set
for 103 countries for the period of 35 years from 1980-2014. Estimated coeffi-
cients of remittances are positive and significant both at the conventional level
of testing and when financial development proxies for instance, interaction terms
are included into the analysis. This suggests the important positive role of remit-
tances on economic growth. The volatility of remittances under OLS models tend
to have negative but insignificant impact on growth. However, under instrumen-
tal variable models the impact of remittance volatility is negative and significant.
The results are in line with the previous works, highlighting the dampening effect
of remittance volatility on economic growth. However, as some of the estimated
coefficients are, although, negative but insignificant, results do not provide with
the strong confirmation.
Estimated coefficients of financial development proxies are positive and significant
confirming the previous findings that financial development effect the economic
growth positively. The positive or negative signs of the interaction terms reveal
the complementary or substitute nature of remittances and financial development,
respectively. For instance, the positive sign indicates that financial development
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and remittances complement each other whereas, the negative sign reveals that
both substitute each other to enhance economic growth. The negative and sig-
nificant interaction term estimates in tables 4.4 and 4.5 confirm the substitution
hypothesis, suggesting that remittances positively impact the economic growth in
the absence of or weaker financial sector. Remittances help to channel resources
by providing funds, insurance and credits for the productive activities in countries
with shallow financial development.
The lagged GDP per capita variable estimates in all the models in both tables
are found to be negative and for some models it is significant too thus support-
ing the conditional convergence hypothesis that poor countries grow faster than
the richer countries. The results are also in line with the neoclassical model in
which case an economy with the low per capita income at the beginning tends
to approach its long run position. Trade openness mostly show positive but non
significant impact on the growth. The average years of primary education and for-
eign direct investment show positive and significant estimates, boosting economic
growth. The coefficient estimates for inflation are negative and significant.
Table 4.6 presents the relationship among remittances, financial development and
total productivity growth using instrumental variables methodology14. The es-
timated coefficients for remittances are negative and insignificant, showing no
impact of remittances on productivity growth. Moreover, the impact of financial
development on productivity growth is also negative but insignificant. The in-
teraction terms have positive signs implying the complementary hypothesis that
financial development supports the remittances to enhance productivity growth.
However, due to the insignificant results, the evidence is not enough to support
this hypothesis. Trade openness have positive and significant impact on produc-
tivity growth.
14OLS estimates provide non-significant results in most models.
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The development level of countries also influence the relationship between finan-
cial sector, remittances and economic growth. Tables 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11
presents the range of results considering the state of development of countries
where, countries are categorized by World Bank income classification. For high
income countries (hc) the estimated coefficients for remittances are mostly posi-
tive but insignificant suggesting less important role of remittance in growth. The
influence of the proxies of financial development on growth is also mixed but in-
significant in most of the cases suggesting no impact of financial development
on economic growth for developed economies. Moreover, the interaction term
coefficients are negative but mostly insignificant, except for the interaction term
CG.REM which is negative and significant supporting the substitution hypothesis.
However, in general, for high income countries the results suggest that financial
development does not play role in making remittances productive. Moreover,
countries with the developed financial markets reliance on remittances for growth
is less as the well functioning banking system performs all the needed financial
activities necessary to channelize productive investments.
The impact of financial development, in case of the low income countries (LC),
on growth appears to be negative and significant under OLS methodology and
also under instrumental variable techniques where, the domestic credits to private
sector (PRVT) as ratio to GDP have dampening effect on economic growth. The
results are in line with the findings by Papadavid, Rewilak and Brighty (2017)
[169], suggesting that the reasons of low growth can be the successive banking
crises or deregulation of financial sector. Other reason can be the fragility of fi-
nancial system in low income countries [70]. The high default rates, which limit the
future supply of credit and hamper the future investments and lending, can also be
the reason behind this negative impact. The estimated coefficients on remittances
in the low income countries are positive but significant only in three models (un-
der OLS LC.2 & LC.3 and IV-GMM 3). In low income countries remittances are
mostly used to meet the immediate consumption requirements. Previous related
literature highlighted the role of remittances in poverty eradication of the recipient
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families than on the economic growth as a whole. Moreover, there is also a possi-
bility among the individual households to choose leisure instead of work because
of easy money, leading to decline in labor supply which poses negative impact on
long-run economic growth. The estimated results for all the interaction terms are
insignificant highlighting that there exist neither complementary nor substitution
relationship between remittances and financial development. It is possible that
due to fragile financial system and banking crises the remittances are not rooted
through the formal official channels which reduces the role of financial sector and
also of the government to control the use of remittances in a productive way.
The estimated outcomes for the Upper middle income countries are presented in
table 4.10. The role of financial development on economic growth as shown by
the estimated coefficients is although positive but insignificant. Remittances show
negative and significant impact on economic growth. The reason can be that
increase in remittances may increase the consumption of non-tradable goods lead-
ing to rise in their prices. This appreciates the real exchange rate and decreases
exports, damaging the receiving country’s competitiveness in the world markets.
The results for the interaction terms support the substitution hypothesis as the
signs of estimated outcomes are negative. This suggests that in case of weak fi-
nancial markets remittances help to finance credit and funds for the productive
activities, helping to boost economic growth.
Table 4.11 presents the range of results considering the data for 27 low middle
income countries. The financial development proxy money supply (M2) as ratio
to GDP estimated outcomes are positive and significant showing that increase in
money supply helps to boost economic growth. Remittances also show positive
and significant impact on growth. Moreover, the interaction terms influence eco-
nomic growth in mixed manner however, the estimates are mostly insignificant.
This shows that remittances do not act either as substitute or complement to
financial development. The hypothesis that financial development helps to use
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the funds received from migrants into productive activities is not supported by
the estimated results. The cause can be the less developed financial markets in
lower middle income countries, or the cost of opening the account at the recipient’s
country is too high or the receiver of the funds only use the banking system to get
the money and spends it immediately on the household consumption.
The wide range of results can be summarized into the following. Considering the
whole set of considered data the financial development impact the economic growth
positively. Remittances impact is also growth boosting. The substitution hypoth-
esis is supported highlighting the positive role of remittances in the absence of or
weaker financial sector in remittance- growth nexus. However, the results vary
when the countries are categorized on their income basis. In case of higher and
upper middle income countries the impact of remittances on growth is mostly in-
significant. The financial development estimated outcomes provide with the weak
confirmation that it influences the economic growth positively. The substitution
hypothesis is supported for the upper middle income countries as estimated results
of the interaction terms are negative and significant. The impact of remittances
and financial development (M2) are positive and significant on economic growth
for the lower middle income countries, furthermore, there is no support for either
complementary hypothesis or substitution hypothesis. For the low income coun-
tries the impact of remittances is positive but not strongly confirmed as most of
the results are positive but insignificant. Moreover, the fragile and weak financial
sector negatively impact the economic growth. Interaction terms results neither
support the substitution nor complementary hypothesis between remittances and
financial development.
4.5 Conclusion
The current work analyzes the impact of financial development (ratio of domestic
credit provided to the private sector to GDP, ratio of claims on central government
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to GDP and ratio of money supply to GDP), remittances and their interaction
term on economic growth and changes in total productivity by using panel data
for 103 countries over the period of 35 years from 1980-2014. The main findings
suggest the positive and significant role of financial development and remittances
on economic growth. Moreover, the substitution hypothesis is supported, which
suggests that in the absence of or in case of weak and shallow financial markets,
remittances provide with the financial help both for consumption as well as for
productive investment activities. The role of financial development and remit-
tances on productivity growth appears to be negative but insignificant.
Furthermore, analysis is also done by categorizing the countries using the World
Bank income classifications. The findings suggest that the development state of
the countries also influence the impact of remittances, financial sector and interac-
tion term on economic growth. In case of high income countries remittances and
financial development appear to have insignificant impact on economic growth.
However, the results support the substitution hypothesis.
For low income countries the impact of remittances is positive but insignificant
on economic growth, suggesting that in poor countries the remittance funds are
immediately used for the consumption purpose, which helps to eradicate individ-
ual poverty, rather than on investment projects and productive activities. More-
over, weaker and fragile financial markets, banking structure and deregulation
show negative impact on growth. The outcomes suggest neither substitution nor
complementary role of financial development and remittances. The influence of
remittances and financial development on economic growth is strongly positive in
case of lower middle income countries. For upper middle income countries the
substitution hypothesis is supported that remittances help to provide funds, un-
restricted credit and better lending opportunities to the households to participate
in productive activities and profitable investments.
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The study also provides with the following policy implications. The effective finan-
cial sector improvements and policies should be carried out in remittance- growth
nexus to reap benefits of this less volatile and time stable foreign exchange inflow.
The policy makers, advisers and researchers should develop and formulate such
policies for the development of financial sector that it should facilitate and sup-
port the receipt and use of remittances in most effective and useful manner.The
measures should also be taken by the governments of the developing countries to
enhance and develop the official and formal channels to direct the flow of remit-
tances in the economies. This will help in minimizing the remittance volatility,
money laundering and misuse of funds on illegal activities.
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Figure 4.2: State of Development, Remittances, Net Exports and FDI
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Figure 4.3: Recipients of Remittances, 2010
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Figure 4.5: State of Development, Financial Development and Remittances
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this dissertation three essays are presented addressing three different questions
in economic growth and development. The second chapter focuses on the mystery
of growth transitions and the shifts in growth performance within a country, high-
lighting the fact that average growth rates mask very distinct growth paths. The
weaknesses of both the statistical and filter-based approaches, to identify struc-
tural breaks in growth series, are overcome by using a variant of unified Fit and
Filter technique [121]. The new methodology provided improved results firstly, by
identifying the breaks in case of volatile growth series generally pertaining to the
developing countries and secondly, by correctly identifying the false breaks in case
of very smooth growth series. Moreover, the proximate sources of growth tran-
sitions are determined by using non-parametric growth accounting. DEA-Based
Malmquist Productivity Index approach is used to decompose the productivity
growth into efficiency change, technological progress, capital deepening and hu-
man capital accumulation.
The results of the structural break analysis show that the structural breaks occur
in all regions of the world. However, up-breaks are more common in the low,
lower middle and upper middle income countries as compared to the high income
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countries where down-breaks occur more common. This confirms the view that
developing countries do not remain in the poverty trap, rather sustainability of
the once achieved positive growth is crucial. The findings in this work also sug-
gest that for both positive and negative breaks sources of productivity growth
are asymmetric. In case of positive breaks, the sources of productivity growth
are factor accumulation following the efficiency improvements. Whereas, in the
case of negative breaks, decline in efficiency is the main cause of productivity slow
down. The results suggest that efficient reallocation of the resources can help the
developing countries to achieve positive and sustainable growth paths, leading to
technological improvements. A further study focus can be on the determination
of sources of efficiency changes, which can give better insight and understanding
upon the reasons of poverty gaps between rich and poor countries and further pro-
vide with the guidelines to formulate suitable policies for the developing countries
to get on the prosperity track.
In chapter 3, Nation’s progress and its determinants, a two-stage approach, the
influence of potential economic, institutional, demographic and geographic deter-
minants on the progress of a nation is examined. Nation’s progress is measured
by using not only the economic factors but also social, environmental and human
welfare variables. The performance of a nation is measured as an estimated ef-
ficiency score within which it transforms a given number of endowments such as
human and physical capital into national well-being and general human welfare.
The economic, environmental and human well-being yardsticks, namely GDP per
capita, persons employed, carbon dioxide emission and availability of clean water
with proper sanitation facilities are used in this works to measure the nation’s
progress. The estimated bias adjusted performance scores in stage 1 are regressed
on the potential covariates. Simar and Wilson’s double bootstrap procedure is
used, which allows valid inferences in the presence of an unknown serial correla-
tion in the efficiency scores. The second stage results reveal that the considered
covariates play a significant role in the progress of a nation.
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The results presented in this chapter suggest many further framework scenarios,
which can be used to increase the nation’s progress and enhance the welfare and
well-being of a country. After the financial system crises, partly caused by the
amplified stress on material growth at all costs, it is realized that actual and
balanced growth and development is being neglected. The requirement now is
to set new goals and establish new ways to estimate progress. The new goals
should consider social, ecological welfare along-with sustainable economic well-
being, moreover, proper measures and strategies should be adapted to achieve
those goals. Policy makers should focus on plans and strategies to better allo-
cate the resources and funds. Conducive environment and suitable institutional
set-up helps to strengthen the performance of a nation. Moreover, trustworthy in-
stitutional environment along-with suitable economic policies helps to reap more
benefits from demographic and geographic factors, which otherwise either need a
lot of time and effort to change (population composition) or cannot be altered
(geography). The impact of the linguistic fractionalization and ethnic differences
can be reduced by redistributing the funds to all sections of the population and
by providing all with the equal access to education and other social benefits.
The fourth chapter shows the impact of financial development and remittances
on economic and productivity growth. A panel of 103 countries including devel-
oped and developing economies over the period 1980-2014 is used to study the role
of financial development, remittances and interaction terms on economic growth
and total productivity. A panel econometric framework is used and the findings
of the study suggest positive role of financial development and remittances on
economic growth. Moreover, the results also support the substitution hypothesis
suggesting the relaxing role of remittances in case of weak financial sector in the
receiving countries. However, the role of financial development and remittances
on productivity growth is insignificant. The findings also suggest that the de-
velopment state of countries also effects the corresponding roles of remittances,
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financial development and interaction terms on economic growth. The study pro-
vides the following policy implications. The effective financial sector improvements
and policies should be carried out in remittance- growth nexus to reap benefits of
this less volatile and time stable foreign exchange inflow (remittances). The pol-
icy makers, advisers and researchers should develop and formulate such policies
for the development of financial sector that it should facilitate and support the
receipt and use of remittances in most effective and useful manner.The measures
should also be taken by the governments of the developing countries to enhance
and develop the official and formal channels to direct the flow of remittances in
their economies. This will help in minimizing the remittance volatility, money
laundering and misuse of funds on illegal activities.
Appendix A.1
Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ ABW 1981 1989
◦ AGO 1994 1986
2006
◦ AIA 1982 1990
2006
◦ ALB 1994 1986
2006
◦ ARE 1988 1980
2004
◦ ARG 1959 1977
1985 1994
2002
◦ ARM 1998
◦ ATG 1978 1989
2006
◦ AUS 1961 1969
◦ AUT 1977
Continued...
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Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ AZE 1998
◦ BDI 1969 1977
1996 1988
2006
◦ BEL 1974
◦ BEN 1978 1986
1994
◦ BFA 1967 1978
1994
◦ BGD 1972
◦ BGR 1997 1988
2006
◦ BHR 1986 1978
◦ BHS 1978 1986
1994 2002
◦ BIH 1998
◦ BLR 1998
◦ BLZ 1986 1978
1994
2004
◦ BMU 1994 2006
◦ BOL 1959 1967
1986 1978
2005
◦ BRA 1967 1980
Continued...
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Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ BRB 1995 1970
2006
◦ BRN 1987 1979
2006
◦ BTN 1982 1990
◦ BWA 1969 1977
1989
◦ CAF 1996 1978
2006
◦ CAN 1961
1996
◦ CHE 1973
1990
◦ CHL 1959 1967
1975 1997
1986
◦ CHN 1968 1960
1977 1985
2001
◦ CIV 1988 1978
2006 1998
◦ CMR 1976 1984
1994
Continued...
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Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ COD 1982 1958
2001 1974
1990
◦ COG 1977 1969
1994 1985
◦ COL 2003 1978
1995
◦ COM 1968
1984
◦ CPV 1977 1969
1993 1985
2006
◦ CRI 1986 1958
1978
◦ CYM 1990
1998
◦ CYP 1964 1972
1990
2006
◦ CZE 1998
◦ DEU 1960
◦ DJI 1978
1989
2005
◦ DMA 1979 1988
Continued...
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Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ DNK 1958 1969
2006
◦ DOM 1968 1960
1990 1976
◦ DZA 1971 1979
1995
◦ ECU 1971 1979
1987
2003
◦ EGY 1975 1984
◦ ESP 1982 1974
2006
◦ EST 1999
◦ ETH 1992 1968
2003 1984
◦ FIN 1993 1974
1985
2006
◦ FJI 1969 1979
1987
◦ FRA 1973
◦ GAB 1968 1976
1987 1998
2006
Continued...
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Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ GBR 1981 1973
1989
2006
◦ GEO 1998
◦ GHA 1983 1963
2006 1974
◦ GIN 1970 1978
1994
◦ GMB 1982
◦ GNB 1971 1979
1987 1997
2005
◦ GNQ 1969 1977
1986 2004
1995
◦ GRC 1961 1972
1996 2006
◦ GRD 1997 1979
1989
2005
◦ GTM 1962 1979
1987
◦ HKG 2002 1994
◦ HND 1963 1979
◦ HRV 1999
Continued...
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Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ HTI 1970 1980
◦ HUN 1996 1978
1988
2006
◦ IDN 1969 1996
1988
2004
◦ IND 1979 1969
2003
◦ IRL 1958 2002
1986
1994
◦ IRN 1988 1969
1977
2006
◦ IRQ 1995 1979
1987
2004
◦ ISL 1969 1978
1995 1987
2006
◦ ISR 1972
◦ ITA 1970
2006
Continued...
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Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ JAM 1980 1961
1988 1972
◦ 1996
◦ JOR 1974 1965
1991 1982
2006
◦ JPN 1958 1970
1990
◦ KAZ 1998
◦ KEN 2003 1967
◦ KGZ 1998
◦ KHM 1980 1988
1998 2006
◦ KNA 1982 1990
2006
◦ KOR 1962 1978
1970 1996
◦ KWT 1982 1998
1990 2006
◦ LAO 1979
◦ LBN 1989 1980
1997
◦ LBR 1995 1971
1987
2003
Continued...
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Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ LCA 1981 1989
◦ LKA 1959
2005
◦ LSO 1970 1978
1987
◦ LTU 1999
◦ LUX 1966 1974
1983 1991
2006
◦ LVA 1998
◦ MAC 2002 1978
1994
◦ MAR 1960 1969
1995
◦ MDA 1998
◦ MDG 1982 1971
1998
◦ MDV 1978 1986
2005
◦ MEX 1989 1981
◦ MKD 1998
◦ MLI 1969 1977
1985
Continued...
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Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ MLT 1964 1980
1972 2000
1988
◦ MMR 1990 1970
1998 1982
2006
◦ MNE 1999
◦ MNG 1994 1986
2002
◦ MOZ 1985 1976
1995 2003
◦ MRT 1984 1968
2006 1976
◦ MSR 1978 1990
1998 2006
◦ MUS 1960 1976
1968
1984
◦ MWI 1960 1968
1984 1976
1997
◦ MYS 1970 1979
1987 1997
◦ NAM 1990 1970
1980
Continued...
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Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ NER 1987 1968
2004 1979
◦ NGA 1968 1960
1984 1976
2001 1992
◦ NIC 1959 1967
1993 1977
◦ NLD 1974
2001
◦ NPL 1980
◦ NZL 1958 1966
1992
◦ OMN 1978
1986
2002
◦ PAK 1960 1970
1979
◦ PAN 1960 1971
1989 1981
2005
◦ PER 1992 1966
1974
1982
◦ PHL 1987 1959
2003 1979
Continued...
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Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ POL 1994 1978
◦ PRT 1984 1974
1992
2001
◦ PRY 1964 1982
1972
2006
◦ PSE 1989 1980
2006 1998
◦ QAT 1987 1979
1996 2004
◦ ROU 1992 1976
2000 1984
◦ RUS 1998
◦ RWA 1968 1986
1994 2002
◦ SAU 1987 1979
2003 1995
◦ SDN 1989 1978
1997 2006
◦ SEN 1994
◦ SGP 1968 1981
1997
◦ SLE 1998 1970
2006 1990
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Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ SLV 1986 1978
◦ SRB 1999
◦ STP 1987 1979
2004
◦ SUR 1994 1978
2002
◦ SVK 2000
◦ SVN 2006
◦ SWE 1996 1970
2006
◦ SWZ 1986 1978
◦ SYC 1969 1979
1987 1998
2006
◦ SYR 1970 1981
1989 1998
2006
◦ TCA 2006
◦ TCD 1981 1971
1997 1989
2005
◦ TGO 1987 1969
2005 1979
1997
Continued...
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Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ THA 1958 1970
1986 1995
◦ TJK 1998
◦ TKM 1998
◦ TTO 1973 1961
1989 1981
1997 2006
◦ TUN 1968 1976
1995 2006
◦ TUR 1967 1958
1984 1976
2001 1993
◦ TWN 1962 1978
1994
◦ TZA 1984 1968
1998 1976
◦ UGA 1961 1969
1980
1988
◦ UKR 1998
◦ URY 1968 1958
1985 1976
2003 1994
◦ USA 1982 1973
◦ UZB 1998
Continued...
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Table 1: List of considered countries with FF breaks in Chapter 1 (h=8)
Country Code Positive Negative
◦ VCT 1980 2006
◦ VEN 1967 1958
1985 1977
2003 1993
◦ VGB 1990 1980
1998
2006
◦ VNM 1990
◦ YEM 2006
◦ ZAF 1998 1970
1981
◦ ZMB 1989 1963
1997 2005
◦ ZWE 1960 1968
1976 1994
2004
No true break is identified for Norway using trimming factor 8.
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Appendix A.2
Table 2: State of Development (region-wise) Quadripartite Decomposition
Indices (positive breaks)
Region Dev.
State
GDP
Growth
EFFCH TECH KACC HACC
Africa hd 3.76 3.12 -0.38 0.73 1.22
md 4.22 2.49 -0.39 2.10 1.24
ld 4.93 3.84 0.15 0.80 1.22
Asia vhd 9.80 6.00 2.03 1.44 1.15
hd 6.12 3.06 0.97 1.89 1.18
md 6.52 4.86 0.18 1.33 1.18
ld 2.61 1.32 -0.67 1.91 1.21
Europe vhd 3.39 1.95 0.36 1.05 1.08
hd 5.66 2.90 1.57 1.34 1.06
md 7.94 8.61 0 -0.68 1.05
North & vhd 2.03 2.17 -0.92 0.69 1.04
Central hd 3.68 1.31 0.26 2.08 1.10
America md 2.39 0.08 0.70 1.59 1.17
ld 2.50 -0.28 -0.55 3.33 1.09
Oceania vhd 2.24 1.33 -0.08 0.94 1.03
hd 5.03 3.03 1.17 0.70 1.14
South vhd 6.66 4.29 1.38 0.88 1.08
America hd 7.13 3.11 2.52 1.26 1.11
md 1.12 -0.74 -0.24 2.06 1.14
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Appendix A.2
Table 3: State of Development (region-wise) Quadripartite Decomposition
Indices (negative breaks)
Region Dev.
State
GDP
Growth
EFFCH TECH KACC HACC
Africa hd -2.47 0.32 -2.44 -0.51 1.30
md -3.02 -1.54 0.16 -1.67 1.30
ld -4.22 -3.14 -0.10 -0.89 1.24
Asia vhd -6.52 -4.75 -1.00 -0.24 1.16
hd -4.90 -2.13 -0.72 -1.97 1.22
md -6.19 -4.06 -1.78 0.88 1.23
ld -3.56 -1.23 -0.19 -1.94 1.20
Europe vhd -2.71 0.24 -2.15 -1.01 1.08
hd -2.13 -0.81 0.06 -1.46 1.09
North & vhd -0.68 3.19 -3.85 -0.29 1.08
Central hd -6.30 -3.02 -1.69 -1.44 1.09
America md -7.21 -3.68 0.31 -3.71 1.22
ld -8.33 -6.50 0.00 -1.55 1.21
Oceania vhd -3.52 -4.82 2.36 -0.68 1.06
hd -7.27 -6.27 0.00 -0.66 1.14
South vhd -4.17 -3.47 0.07 -0.66 1.06
America hd -4.06 -2.30 0.06 -1.76 1.17
md -5.93 -4.31 1.10 -2.59 1.14
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Appendix A.3
Code for the Malmquist Productivity Index.
my.data=read.table(file.choose(),header=T)(data.csv)
y=cbind(my.data$rgdpo)
x=cbind(my.data$rkna, my.data$hatlabor)
library(plm)
my.data=plm.data(my.data, index=c(”countrycode”,”year”))
my.data=na.omit(my.data)
my.ctry=c(”Country Codes”)
my.data=my.data[my.data$countrycode %in% my.ctry,]
my.data=my.data[my.data$year%in% 1950:2014,]
my.data1=my.data[my.data$countrycode%in% my.ctry,]
my.data1=my.data[my.data$year%in% year2:year2,]
my.data2=my.data[my.data$countrycode %in% my.ctry,]
my.data2=my.data[my.data$year%in% year3:year3,]
my.data3=my.data[my.data$countrycode %in% my.ctry,]
my.data3=my.data[my.data$year%in% year1:year1,]
library(FEAR)
X1=cbind(my.data1$rkna,my.data1$hatlabor)
Y1=as.matrix(c(my.data1$rgdpo))
X2=cbind(my.data2$rkna, my.data2$hatlabor)
Y2=as.matrix(c(my.data2$rgdpo))
X3=cbind(my.data3$rkna, my.data3$hatlabor)
Y3=as.matrix(c(my.data3$rgdpo))
seq.malm = function(X1,Y1,X2,Y2,X1REF=rbind(X1,X3),Y1REF=rbind(Y1,Y3),
X2REF=rbind(X2,X1,X3),Y2REF=rbind(Y2,Y1,Y3),ORIENTATION=2,RTS=3)[
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D11 = 1/dea(t(X1),t(Y1),RTS=RTS,ORIENTATION=ORIENTATION,XREF=t(X1REF),YREF=t(Y1REF))
D12 = 1/dea(t(X1),t(Y1),RTS=RTS,ORIENTATION=ORIENTATION,XREF=t(X2REF),YREF=t(Y2REF))
D21 = 1/dea(t(X2),t(Y2),RTS=RTS,ORIENTATION=ORIENTATION,XREF=t(X1REF),YREF=t(Y1REF))
D22 = 1/dea(t(X2),t(Y2),RTS=RTS,ORIENTATION=ORIENTATION,XREF=t(X2REF),YREF=t(Y2REF))
if (ORIENTATION==2)effch = D11/D22; techch = sqrt((D22/D21)*(D12/D11));
capdeep=sqrt((D21/D11)*(D22/D12))
print(return(list(effch=effch,techch=techch,capdeep=capdeep, D11=D11,D22=D22,D12=D12,D21=D21)))]
malm=seq.malm(X1,Y1,X2,Y2, X1REF=rbind(X1,X3), Y1REF=rbind(Y1,Y3), X2REF=rbind(X2,X1,X3),
Y2REF=rbind(Y2,Y1,Y3), RTS=3, ORIENTATION=2)

Appendix B.1
Countries Included
Tables 4 and 5 give the list of the 33 advanced economies (as listed by IMF having a Hu-
man Development Index (HDI) above 0.8) and 49 developing economies considered in chapter 2
alongwith summary statistics of efficiency estimates.
Table 4: List of Selected Advanced Economies
Country Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
◦ Argentina 1.060 0.023 1.027 1.102
◦ Australia 1.001 0.0001 1.001 1.002
◦ Austria 1.000 0.0001 1.000 1.001
◦ Bahrain 1.021 0.015 1.002 1.056
◦ Belgium 1.003 0.0001 1.003 1.003
◦ Canada 1.003 0.0002 1.003 1.003
◦ Chile 1.065 0.041 1.011 1.140
◦ Cyprus 1.003 0.003 1.001 1.013
◦ Denmark 1.002 0.0001 1.002 1.003
◦ Finland 1.013 0.0008 1.013 1.015
◦ France 1.007 0.0001 1.007 1.007
Continued...
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Table 4: List of Selected Advanced Economies
Country Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
◦ Germany 1.005 0.0002 1.005 1.005
◦ Greece 1.026 0.016 1.005 1.053
◦ Hungary 1.018 0.007 1.010 1.031
◦ Ireland 1.076 0.004 1.062 1.079
◦ Israel 1.001 0.0001 1.000 1.001
◦ Italy 1.0003 0.0001 1.003 1.003
◦ Japan 1.002 0.001 1.001 1.007
◦ Korea Rep. 1.031 0.016 1.013 1.054
◦ Kuwait 1.020 0.023 1.004 1.092
◦ Luxembourg 1.020 0.019 1.007 1.087
◦ Netherlands 1.010 0.001 1.009 1.012
◦ New Zealand 1.001 0.0001 1.001 1.001
◦ Norway 1.011 0.002 1.010 1.018
◦ Poland 1.072 0.025 1.024 1.099
◦ Portugal 1.025 0.015 1.003 1.050
◦ Saudi Arabia 1.054 0.031 1.010 1.089
◦ Singapore 1.002 0.001 1.001 1.003
◦ Spain 1.001 0.0004 1.001 1.002
◦ Sweden 1.004 0.0001 1.004 1.004
◦ Switzerland 1.001 0.0005 1.001 1.002
◦ UK 1.004 0.0001 1.004 1.005
◦ US 1.011 0.013 1.003 1.059
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Table 5: List of Selected Developing Economies
Country Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
◦ Bangladesh 1.304 0.016 1.279 1.332
◦ Bolivia 1.574 0.117 1.410 1.797
◦ Botswana 1.328 0.044 1.255 1.400
◦ Brazil 1.136 0.022 1.092 1.167
◦ Bulgaria 1.072 0.009 1.054 1.080
◦ Burundi 1.058 0.084 1.006 1.259
◦ Cameroon 1.517 0.075 1.409 1.610
◦ China 1.028 0.045 1.008 1.237
◦ Colombia 1.200 0.029 1.155 1.242
◦ Dominican Rep. 1.209 0.015 1.186 1.231
◦ Ecuador 1.322 0.110 1.165 1.527
◦ Egypt 1.054 0.025 1.017 1.094
◦ El Salvador 1.261 0.035 1.194 1.321
◦ Fiji 1.023 0.016 1.012 1.089
◦ Ghana 2.025 0.121 1.900 2.282
◦ Guatemala 1.177 0.029 1.116 1.212
◦ India 1.157 0.064 1.008 1.253
◦ Indonesia 1.584 0.233 1.320 2.012
◦ Iran 1.057 0.021 1.029 1.091
◦ Jamaica 1.148 0.006 1.139 1.159
◦ Jordan 1.027 0.003 1.020 1.032
◦ Kenya 1.748 0.065 1.626 1.905
◦ Lesotho 1.557 0.130 1.063 1.688
◦ Malawi 1.612 0.250 1.223 2.049
◦ Malaysia 1.074 0.032 1.031 1.130
Continued...
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Table 5: List of Selected Developing Economies
Country Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
◦ Mali 1.397 0.126 1.188 1.657
◦ Mauritania 1.963 0.163 1.716 2.302
◦ Mauritius 1.026 0.011 1.011 1.044
◦ Mexico 1.204 0.071 1.100 1.334
◦ Mongolia 1.842 0.145 1.620 2.018
◦ Morocco 1.143 0.033 1.095 1.190
◦ Mozambique 1.066 0.084 1.010 1.256
◦ Namibia 1.761 0.100 1.615 1.906
◦ Nepal 1.207 0.050 1.031 1.279
◦ Pakistan 1.276 0.043 1.178 1.350
◦ Paraguay 1.379 0.220 1.084 1.824
◦ Peru 1.379 0.103 1.231 1.566
◦ Philippines 1.302 0.070 1.202 1.446
◦ Rwanda 1.128 0.078 1.045 1.275
◦ Senegal 1.206 0.007 1.199 1.226
◦ South Africa 1.365 0.066 1.260 1.452
◦ Sri Lanka 1.219 0.119 1.048 1.436
◦ Swaziland 1.533 0.239 1.293 1.908
◦ Tanzania 2.056 0.096 1.937 2.268
◦ Thailand 1.079 0.029 1.046 1.133
◦ Tunisia 1.085 0.029 1.031 1.130
◦ Turkey 1.073 0.027 1.025 1.106
◦ Uganda 1.404 0.121 1.273 1.659
◦ Uruguay 1.048 0.017 1.022 1.072
Appendix B.2
Bias Corrected Data Envelopment Analysis with Environmental Variables
Package ”rDEA”
Authors: Jack Simm and Galina Besstremyannaya
Y=cbind(output variables )
X=cbind(input variables)
Z=cbind(environmental variables)
Bias corrected DEA scores
DEA scores=dea.robust(X=x, Y=y, model=”output”,RTS=”variable”, alpha=0.05, bw=”cv”)
Bias corrected DEA score in variable RTS, output-oriented model with environmen-
tal variables.
results=dea.env.robust(X=x,Y=y,Z=z,model=”output”,RTS=”variable”,L1=100,L2=2000, alpha=0.05)

Appendix C.1
Table 6: List of 103 Countries considered in Chapter 3
Country List
◦ Algeria ◦ Jordan
◦ Argentina ◦ Kenya
◦ Australia ◦ Korea, Rep.
◦ Austria ◦ Kuwait
◦ Bangladesh ◦ Lesotho
◦ Barbados ◦ Madagascar
◦ Belgium ◦ Malawi
◦ Belize ◦ Malaysia
◦ Benin ◦ Mali
◦ Bolivia ◦ Malta
◦ Botswana ◦ Mauritania
◦ Brazil ◦ Mauritius
◦ Burkina Faso ◦ Mexico
◦ Burundi ◦ Morocco
◦ Cabo Verde ◦ Nepal
◦ Cameroon ◦ Netherlands
Continued...
170 AppendixC
Table 6: List of 103 Countries considered in Chapter 3
Country List
◦ Canada ◦ New Zealand
◦ Central African Rep. ◦ Nicaragua
◦ Chad ◦ Niger
◦ Chile ◦ Nigeria
◦ China ◦ Norway
◦ Colombia ◦ Oman
◦ Congo, Dem. Rep. ◦ Pakistan
◦ Congo, Rep. of ◦ Panama
◦ Costa Rica ◦ Paraguay
◦ Cote d‘Ivoire ◦ Peru
◦ Cyprus ◦ Philippines
◦ Denmark ◦ Portugal
◦ Dominican Rep. ◦ Rwanda
◦ Ecuador ◦ Saudi Arabia
◦ Egypt ◦ Senegal
◦ El Salvador ◦ Sierra Leone
◦ Fiji ◦ Spain
◦ Finland ◦ Sri Lanks
◦ France ◦ St. Lucia
◦ Gabon ◦ St. Vincent and
◦ Gambia, The ◦ Sudan
◦ Germany ◦ Suriname
◦ Ghana ◦ Swaziland
◦ Greece ◦ Sweden
Continued...
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Table 6: List of 103 Countries considered in Chapter 3
Country List
◦ Guatemala ◦ Switzerland
◦ Honduras ◦ Thailand
◦ Iceland ◦ Togo
◦ India ◦ Trinidad and To
◦ Indonesia ◦ Tunisia
◦ Iran ◦ Turkey
◦ Ireland ◦ Uganda
◦ Israel ◦ UK
◦ Italy ◦ United States
◦ Jamaica ◦ Uruguay
◦ Japan ◦ Venezuela, RB
◦ Zimbabwe
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